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I. Introduction
1. Membership of the euro area strengthens the
degree of economic interdependence between
Member States through the existence of a single
monetary policy and by fostering closer trade and
financial ties and encouraging a closer coordina-
tion of economic policies. In view of this interde-
pendence, euro area members face economic chal-
lenges which are related to, and in some cases more
immediate than, those confronted by all Member
States of the European Union (EU).
2. The ‘Annual statement on the euro area’, and its
companion piece, the ‘Annual report on the euro
area’, present the Commission’s views on the nature
of these challenges and discuss the appropriate
response of economic policies at the euro area and
Member State level (1). It aims to raise awareness and
stimulate a broad debate on euro area economic poli-
cies and developments; issues that are relevant for the
310 million people living in the euro area. It is also
salient in the context of euro area enlargement, with
Slovenia becoming the newest Member State to join
the euro area on 1 January 2007 (2). By informing
policymakers and the broader public, it complements
the Commission’s analysis of the euro area economy
in publications such as the ‘Quarterly report on the
euro area’, ‘Public finances in EMU’ and the ‘EU
economy review’.
II. Improving outlook for the economy
3. Shaking off the sluggishness of the last five years,
the euro area is experiencing a recovery in eco-
nomic activity. Businesses are looking to the future
with greater optimism thanks to strong corporate
profits and low interest rates. Consumers, too, are
gradually becoming more confident about the road
ahead with expenditure expected to pick up gradu-
ally after several cautious years. The euro area’s bet-
ter performance at home is supported by a continued
strong growth in external demand. This reflects
buoyant world trade, but also improving competi-
tiveness at the global level.
4. Growth is going back to potential, but there are no
grounds for complacency. The European Commis-
sion’s latest forecast expects euro area GDP to
grow by 2.1 % in 2006 — as compared with a
growth rate of 1.3 % in 2005. Consumer price
inflation, which reached 2.2 % last year, partly as a
result of high energy costs, is expected to remain at
this level. This year, over a million new jobs will
be created in the euro area. Nevertheless, in spite of
the recent substantial decline, the unemployment
rate still remains at 7.9 % of the labour force in
May 2006, while with employment growth at
0.9 % per annum, the pace of job creation in the
euro area is still too slow. Similarly, the low rate of
potential growth in the euro area, around 2 % per
annum, underlines, inter alia, the need for produc-
tivity-enhancing reforms. Redressing this balance
is a top priority for euro area policies in the years
ahead.
5. Risks to the outlook are on the upside in the short
term, but more on the downside over the medium
term. Over the short term, job creation and the posi-
tive effects of past or ongoing economic reforms in
the euro area could help to spur economic growth by
more than expected. Over the medium term, the pos-
sibility of further rises in oil prices could dampen
growth conditions in the euro area. The risk of a dis-
orderly unwinding of global imbalances could
undermine global growth and the euro area’s eco-
nomic recovery. On the upside, the windfall profits
of oil-exporting countries may translate into extra
demand for euro area goods and services.
III. Securing sound macroeconomic 
policies
6. Macroeconomic policies have played an important
role in the euro area’s economic recovery, building
on the credibility of the policy framework created
by EMU. Monetary policy helped to spur economic
activity and confidence by keeping an accommodat-
ing stance, which led to historically low nominal and
real interest rates in 2005, while maintaining price
stability. Fiscal policy has also been supportive of
economic growth in the euro area. Indeed, most
Member States were, thanks to previous efforts to
promote fiscal consolidation, in a better position to
allow the automatic stabilisers to play a broadly sup-
portive role in recent years.
7. As the economic situation improves, the macroeco-
nomic policy setting must evolve. With respect to
monetary policy, the monetary stimulus given in
recent years is gradually being withdrawn. Budget-
ary authorities have a responsibility to recharge
Europe’s budgetary batteries after the economic
slowdown by improving budgetary balances and
paying off government debt. Securing the sustaina-
bility of public finances is also essential in view of
the additional budgetary pressures that will stem
from the ageing of the euro area’s population.
¥1∂ The ‘Annual statement on the euro area’ was adopted by the College of
Commissioners as a communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee,
the Committee of the Regions and the European Central Bank on
12 July 2006, COM(2006)392 final.
¥2∂ The current members of the euro area are Belgium, Germany, Greece,
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria,
Portugal, and Finland.
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According to the Commission’s latest forecast,
overall government borrowing in the euro area is
expected to remain unchanged in 2006 in spite of the
improved economic situation, although less tempo-
rary measures imply somewhat better structural bal-
ances. To fully implement the preventive arm of the
Stability and Growth Pact, some euro area Member
States will need to undertake a more ambitious
budgetary adjustment in 2006 and 2007 than envis-
aged in their 2005 stability programmes.
8. Concerns that an adjustment in macroeconomic
policy would cut short the economic recovery are
unjustified. The real worry is that a failure to under-
take such adjustment will undermine the conditions
for continued economic growth in the euro area by
postponing policy decisions that are necessary to
sustain the recovery over the medium term. When it
comes to macroeconomic policy, Europeans have
learned the hard way that a strategy of wait and see
will not do. In the 1970s and 1980s, a disregard for
macroeconomic stability during the good times con-
tributed to a crippling legacy of persistent inflation,
high deficits and rising debt laying the ground for
low growth and high unemployment. More recently,
the favourable growth at the end of the 1990s was
not seized upon to complete the fiscal consolidation
undertaken in the run up to EMU. With economic
growth in the euro area experiencing a sustained
pick-up for the first time since 1999, the European
Commission considers that a prudent macroeco-
nomic policy mix delivering price stability and
reduced fiscal imbalances coupled with structural
reforms to improve the functioning of product,
labour and capital markets would be the appropriate
policy response.
IV. Enhancing economic reform 
in the euro area
9. Winning the battle for macroeconomic stability in
the euro area and the war for growth and jobs is an
economic and political priority. Twelve million
men and women are still unemployed in the euro
area. Growth and productivity are too low, espe-
cially when the challenges presented by our ageing
population are considered. Technological advances
and globalisation are not yet fully benefiting all
Europeans. Whereas some lay the blame for the euro
area’s disappointing growth and employment per-
formance over the last five years at the door of the
single currency, the real reason lies in insufficient
progress in product, labour and capital market
reform. Stepping up the pace of economic reforms,
fostering greater competition and ensuring macro-
economic stability are central to the Lisbon partner-
ship for growth and jobs. 
10. Ensuring broad public support is central to the
success of economic reforms. While there is a
growing awareness in Europe of the need for macro-
economic stability, a few persistent myths about
economic reform need to be addressed. One is that
economic reform is about giving up a standard of
living that Europeans can no longer afford.
Although it can entail short-term adjustment costs,
economic reform is ultimately about raising
Europe’s standard of living. According to a study by
the European Commission, comprehensive eco-
nomic reforms in product, labour and capital mar-
kets could raise potential growth in the EU from 2 %
to 3 %. This means more jobs, higher disposable
incomes and the modernisation of Europe’s unique
welfare state. Another myth is that economic reform
is about making Europe less European by importing
a different economic and social model. On the con-
trary, economic reform is about reconnecting with
the European values of entrepreneurship and social
concern that are embedded in the Treaty of Rome.
11. EU leaders have recognised that economic reform
is part and parcel of euro area membership. The
Spring European Council earlier this year again
underlined that, in a monetary union, well-function-
ing product, labour and capital markets have an
important role to play in raising growth potential and
also in cushioning the impact of economic shocks.
Prices and wages that respond rapidly to changing
economic circumstances are also essential for deal-
ing with unwarranted inflation and growth differ-
ences between euro area Member States. Although
all EU Member States stand to gain from the Lisbon
reform agenda, the members of the euro area have an
added incentive to enhance structural reform efforts
as the benefits of greater competition will accrue
more quickly if members of a monetary union open
up their markets in tandem.
12. It is paramount that euro area Member States take
resolute steps on the path of economic reform identi-
fied in the ‘Integrated guidelines for growth and
jobs’ for the period 2005–08. The Commission’s
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annual progress report on the Lisbon strategy, which
was adopted in January 2006, notes that euro area
Member States have shown commitment in their
national reform programmes to achieving sustainable
public finances, bolstering labour productivity and
raising employment and participation rates while
respecting the imperatives of sustainable develop-
ment. Nevertheless, some euro area Member States
will need to go further to ensure well-functioning
goods, services, labour and capital markets for a
dynamic and smooth functioning EMU. Key priorities
in this regard include stepping up the pace of R & D in
the euro area, promoting greater competition in ser-
vices and network industries, notably in energy, and
achieving greater labour-market adaptability.
13. To ensure a sustainable social model, achieving
higher growth and more jobs is critical. In this con-
text, reforms pioneered by Nordic countries, which
are often referred to as ‘flexicurity’, may represent a
source of inspiration for euro area Member States.
These reforms have led to dynamic economies by
promoting a high degree of adaptability in work
organisation and labour relations while providing
security for workers, inter alia, through substantial
investment in life-long learning and retraining and
activation policies for unemployed people.
Although there is not a single, one-size-fits-all
model of ‘flexicurity’, the principle of increasing
flexibility where needed in the labour market whilst
safeguarding certain securities for workers may be
implemented by various means (1). The experience
of the Nordic countries may not be easily transferred
to other Member States. Besides the fact that prefer-
ences may be different at the national level, policy-
makers must also give due regard to, for example,
the budgetary implications of such reforms, espe-
cially in countries still running significant deficits or
which may be under strain from the budgetary con-
sequences of ageing populations.
V. One money, one market 
14. In the 1980s, Member States recognised that estab-
lishing ‘one market’ in Europe provided a powerful
argument for the creation of ‘one money’. Now that
one money is a reality, euro area Member States must
have the conviction to support policies that sustain the
internal market. Over the last 12 months, some have
challenged this goal by emphasising the national
imperative of protecting key industries from cross-
border competition. But this prohibits companies
from exploring all the possibilities offered by the
internal market, and is to the detriment of consumers
who forego the benefits of lower prices and increased
choice. Fifty years ago, the signatories of the Treaty
of Rome made a break from such policies by declar-
ing their solemn commitment to the free movement of
persons, goods, services and capital, providing the
basis for Europe’s economic prosperity and political
stability in the second half of the 20th century. The
commitment to these principles has to be renewed by
choosing economic policies that sustain the internal
market and foster tangible economic benefits for the
euro area and EU as a whole.
15. Economic reform within Member States is neces-
sary to deepen the internal market and sustain
EMU. The internal market plays a key role in
achieving the objective of creating more growth and
jobs. Supported by the single currency, it promotes
a more efficient allocation of resources and offers
greater trading opportunities to businesses and a
wider choice to consumers. But the internal market
can only achieve its full potential if legislation
agreed at the European level is effectively imple-
mented and applied by all Member States. In this
respect, the poor performance of most euro area
Member States in transposing and applying internal
market legislation remains a source of concern.
Seven euro area Member States have not reached the
1.5 % transposition-deficit target, while the four
largest euro area countries are the worst performers
among the EU-25 in terms of the number of
infringement cases. To raise growth potential further
and increase the responsiveness of the euro area to
economic shocks, moving ahead with further eco-
nomic integration through a fuller transposition and
better implementation of directives will be essential.
16. Reforming the service sector is crucial for the euro
area. The importance of promoting greater integra-
tion in the services sector should not be underesti-
mated given that services account for around 70 %
of total jobs and value added in the euro area econ-
omy. In this respect, the full implementation of the
EU services directive, following its adoption later
¥1∂ The Commission has started a process of reflection and analysis on the dif-
ferent concepts of ‘flexicurity’ and intends to bring forward a communica-
tion on this issue in the first half of 2007.
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this year, is crucial to foster competition and eco-
nomic dynamism in Europe and fully exploit the
potential benefits offered by the single currency.
17. Financial market integration, in particular, offers
real benefits by contributing to greater productivity
and competitiveness and ultimately increasing the
potential for economic growth. Removing the barri-
ers to the creation of a single euro payments area
would provide stronger incentives for trade, con-
sumption and investment within the euro area by
allowing citizens and businesses to make cross-bor-
der payments as easily, safely and efficiently as they
already can within their own countries and subject to
identical charges. Financial market integration can
also contribute to the smooth functioning of EMU
by promoting macroeconomic adjustment and
increasing the resilience of the euro area to external
economic shocks. Economic studies suggest that EU
financial market integration could increase GDP by
between 0.5 and 1.1 % over time.
18. The EU and euro area must build on the achieve-
ments of the euro and the EU’s financial services
action plan. This calls for consolidating existing
legislation on financial services and ensuring that
internal market rules are implemented on time and
enforced effectively. Further action will be required
to open up Europe’s fragmented retail financial
services, for example, by making it easier for con-
sumers to shop around for the best savings plans,
mortgages, insurance and pensions. Another major
challenge over the next five years is to develop a
pan-European approach to financial market regula-
tion and supervision to keep pace with the increasing
cross-border integration of the financial industry.
While this is essentially a positive — and even
necessary — development to enhance the economic
growth potential of the EU, it also means that
national authorities need to be willing to adapt and
adjust to the new financial landscape. In this context,
the continuing tendency by Member States to add
unnecessary provisions when transposing directives
into national law must be curtailed if the full benefits
of an integrated market for financial services are to
be realised.
19. In order to generate sustainable improvements in
productivity growth, the euro area needs to gener-
ate and, above all, absorb and exploit knowledge. A
high degree of competition and favourable frame-
work conditions for companies to innovate are
essential in this respect, including an integrated and
efficient framework for the protection of intellectual
property rights. Businesses need to enjoy a friendly
regulatory framework, have sufficient supply of
highly-qualified personnel and to have access to
affordable sources of financing. In addition, more
resources need to be invested in R & D and innova-
tion and, in particular, Europe-wide economies of
scale should be exploited by encouraging private
spending in R & D and projects and activities with
significant cross-border spillovers. R & D expendi-
tures in the euro area stand at around 2 % of GDP,
thus significantly short of the EU-wide objective of
3 %. All euro area Member States have set targets
with respect to rising R & D expenditures when sub-
mitting their national reform programmes or there-
after.
20. Reforms that aim at increasing labour utilisation
and human capital will also improve the adaptabil-
ity and facilitate the mobility of the euro area’s
workforce. Moreover, measures that focus on the
matching of labour demand and supply, for example
through an upgrading of public employment ser-
vices, can be expected to improve adjustment to
shocks. Although some euro area Member States
have undertaken reforms in this field, measures have
generally targeted flexibility of work contracts for
new entrants and people facing particular difficul-
ties in the labour market through fixed-term con-
tracts, job agencies and public employment
schemes, while leaving unchanged some aspects of
the legislation on permanent employment that may
act as a barrier to labour-market adjustment.
21. In order to improve the supply of highly skilled
labour across the euro area, an upgrading of edu-
cation and training systems in many Member
States is necessary. Efforts should concentrate on
upgrading the quality of human capital and the skills
base of the workforce. Youth education attainment
levels are significantly lower in the euro area than in
the rest of the EU. Policies are also required to
develop coherent and comprehensive life-long
learning strategies, which will help to promote flex-
ible learning pathways from an early stage, a sig-
nificant decline in early school-leaving, to increase
completion rates at upper secondary level, and to
improve the quality, relevance and attractiveness of
vocational education and training. The quality of ter-
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tiary education needs to be improved to increase the
contribution of universities to social and economic
innovation. Excellence should be pursued through
the networking of higher education institutions with
research and technological centres and enterprises.
An efficient use by Member States of available EU
funding, in particular the European Social Fund and
education and training programmes, would contrib-
ute to meeting these goals.
VI. A dynamic and smooth functioning 
EMU
22. The persistence of cross-country growth and infla-
tion differences in the euro area deserves attention.
In 2005, for example, the gap between the fastest-
and slowest-growing countries in the euro area stood
at 4â percentage points and the gap between the
highest and lowest inflation rates stood at 3 percent-
age points. As discussed in the ‘Annual report on the
euro area’, growth and inflation differences are a
normal feature of monetary unions and can reflect a
variety of benign factors, including differences in
population growth and the effect of catching-up by
less rich Member States. Cyclical differences have
been substantially reduced in recent years, thanks to
a closer alignment of cycles and the reduction of
policy errors due to better macroeconomic policy
coordination. This is a positive development for a
monetary union. However, the decreasing impor-
tance of cyclical factors means that structural factors
now account for a high share of the growth differ-
ences that remain. In particular, it appears that some
Member States may be adjusting to economic
shocks and long-term economic developments only
very sluggishly. Unless policies change, this means
that the gulf between the euro area’s fast- and slow-
growing Member States may become entrenched
over time, and that inflation differentials may trans-
late into a serious loss of competitiveness, which
would require a more significant adjustment the
more action is delayed.
23. Getting to grips with growth and inflation differ-
ences requires a mix of sound budgetary policies
and economic reforms. The action to be taken is
identified in the ‘Integrated guidelines for growth
and jobs’ for the period 2005–08. Maintaining pru-
dent budgetary policies, particularly during the good
times, will allow the automatic budgetary stabilisers
to cushion the economic shocks that drive growth
and inflation differences. Economic reforms will
also help prices and wages to react more rapidly to
changing economic circumstances and favour a
more efficient allocation of resources. Most Mem-
ber States need to step up the pace of reforms to fos-
ter competition and raise productivity in the market
for goods and services. Policies that deepen the
internal market in the area of services, such as finan-
cial markets, could also help by promoting a closer
alignment of national business cycles. Furthermore,
some Member States may need to take steps to
ensure that the process of wage determination pays
sufficient regard to price stability, trends in produc-
tivity over the medium term and differences across
skills and local labour-market conditions.
VII. The euro area’s global role 
and challenges
24. The euro is a key global currency, providing bene-
fits to the euro area and underlining the need to
pay due regard to international financial develop-
ments. The launch of the euro has led to a seismic
shift in international financial markets. Today, the
euro area represents about one sixth of world GDP
and a fifth of world trade and the euro accounts for
a substantial and increasing part in the denomination
of the international debt market (31.5 % versus 44 %
for the US dollar by mid-2005). The euro also
accounts for a significant proportion of international
bank liabilities and foreign exchange transactions.
For example, since 1999, the euro has been the
second currency of denomination of loans by euro
area banks to non-bank borrowers outside the euro
area, with the share above 39 % in the first quarter
of 2005 (against 44 % for the US dollar). The euro is
also widely used to quote, invoice and settle external
trade transactions between the euro area and third
countries and, in some cases, between third coun-
tries. The euro also plays an important role as an
international foreign exchange reserve currency,
accounting for about 25 % of world reserves, com-
pared with 66 % for the US dollar.
25. The unprecedented size and duration of global
imbalances is a key challenge for the world
economy and the euro area. In 2005, the United
States posted the largest current account deficit in its
history — equivalent to 6.4 % of US GDP and 1.5 %
of world GDP. The deficit is mostly financed by
capital inflows from Japan, China and other east
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Asian countries, and recently also from the Middle
East (which profits from oil revenue windfalls).
Although financial markets have been relatively
sanguine about this situation, the unprecedented size
and duration of global imbalances means that they
cannot go on indefinitely.
26. A disorderly unwinding of global imbalances could
have a severe, negative effect on the growth of the
world economy and international financial stabil-
ity. Although the euro area has a roughly balanced
current account, it would not be immune to the
effects of such a crisis. A disorderly adjustment of
global imbalances could affect euro area trade due to
changes in exchange rates and global demand. It
would affect the value of assets held abroad by euro
area residents. Business confidence could also be
severely hit, particularly in the event of a severe out-
put contraction in deficit regions.
27. Tackling global imbalances in an orderly manner
requires a gradual shift in global demand from
regions with current-account deficits to regions
with current-account surpluses. The United States
can play its part by increasing private and public
savings. Stability-oriented macroeconomic policies,
and in particular sustainable public finances, could
make an important contribution in this regard. In
east Asia, the challenge is to reduce excess savings.
A transition to more domestically-generated growth
through improved social-security systems and finan-
cial market development would help to reduce glo-
bal external imbalances. This would also support
east Asia’s longer-term development. As domestic
demand accelerates in these countries, their savings
(and current-account) surpluses will be reduced.
28. Economic reforms in Europe will help the euro
area to adjust to potentially adverse global develop-
ments and to play a part in the orderly correction
of global imbalances. Better-functioning product,
labour and capital markets would make Europe
more attractive to investors even if they would be
unlikely to result in large changes in the current
account, because both demand and supply would
rise. Also, only a fraction of a change in the euro
area current account would appear as an improve-
ment in the US current account. Nevertheless, eco-
nomic reforms remain desirable from the point of
view of improving the euro area’s performance, as
they increase growth potential and strengthen resil-
ience to possible adverse economic shocks. This
issue is explored in greater detail in the ‘Annual
report on the euro area’.
VIII. Increasing the effectiveness 
of coordination
29. Sustaining the economic recovery and promoting
macroeconomic stability and structural reforms
for a dynamic and smooth functioning EMU
requires commitment by Member States and strong
leadership at the euro area level. The spring 2006
European Council recognised the special impor-
tance of enhanced structural reforms for Member
States that share the euro and stressed the necessity
of effective policy coordination within the euro area.
Alongside the key role played by Ecofin, the Euro-
group, which brings together, on an informal basis,
the finance ministers of the euro area, the Commis-
sion and the ECB, is helping to promote a euro-area-
wide consensus on shared economic policy chal-
lenges. Euro area Member States could benefit more
from the Eurogroup meetings by engaging in a more
thorough discussion of macroeconomic policies and
a closer follow-up of structural reforms in the euro
area Member States, particularly where these are
important for the functioning of EMU. Steps could
also be taken to increase the effectiveness of eco-
nomic policy coordination in the euro area, for
example, by eventually switching to an EU semester
for budgetary surveillance, coordinating national
budgetary calendars among euro area Member
States, and ensuring greater coherence between
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms.
30. The growing importance of the euro as a global
currency and the challenges posed by, inter alia,
global imbalances, underlines the need for the
euro area to show leadership on the world stage.
The Commission recognises that some progress has
been made in this respect in recent years. The
appointment of a Eurogroup president for a two-year
term of office in 2004 has, for example, brought
greater stability to the external representation of the
euro area. Nevertheless, the scarcity of common
positions among euro area authorities and the lack of
firm commitments from its Member States on issues
of shared strategic significance have made it diffi-
cult for Europe to show global economic leadership.
The European Commission supports, and is ready to
contribute to, a better coordination of EU external
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representation in international financial institutions
and forums.
IX. Conclusions
31. Sharing a single currency implies confronting
common challenges and responsibilities. This
‘Annual statement on the euro area’ has highlighted
the most salient challenges for the euro area. The
improved outlook for the euro area economy calls
for a decisive adjustment of macroeconomic poli-
cies, notably by accelerating budgetary consolida-
tion. In the microeconomic domain, enhanced struc-
tural reforms are essential for raising productivity
and promoting growth and jobs. They are also
important for the smooth functioning of EMU, as
prices and wages are adjusting too slowly to eco-
nomic shocks in some Member States. At the same
time, euro area members have a strong incentive to
deepen the internal market, as increased economic
integration will help to reap in full the benefits of the
single currency and to respond rapidly to economic
developments. In the external domain, the growing
importance of the euro as a global currency and the
challenges facing the world economy underline the
need for a more prominent role on international
issues. Meeting these challenges and fulfilling
responsibilities requires commitment by Member
States and measures to improve the effectiveness of
economic policy coordination.
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5Summary
This ‘Annual report on the euro area’, which was pre-
pared by the Commission services, explores in greater
depth the shared economic challenges facing euro area
members highlighted in the ‘Annual statement on the
euro area’. 
Macroeconomic developments and outlook (Chapter 1):
Following a comparatively sluggish recovery from the
2001–03 slowdown, the outlook for the euro area in 2006
is more positive, thanks to a strengthening of domestic
demand and the continuing strength of the world economy.
According to the Commission’s spring 2006 forecasts,
euro area GDP will grow by 2.1 % in 2006, with over
1 million new jobs being created this year. The short-term
risks to the euro area’s continued economic recovery
appear to be fairly balanced. On the internal side, upside
risks include the possibility that past or ongoing structural
reforms could spur consumer confidence by more than
expected. On the external side, the possibility of a disor-
derly unwinding of global imbalances is among the down-
side risks. 
The macroeconomic policy setting (Chapter 2): The euro
area’s economic recovery has been supported by EMU’s
macroeconomic framework, which has delivered a favour-
able policy mix of low interest rates and given greater
scope for automatic budgetary stabilisers to operate. As the
economic situation and outlook in the euro area improve,
an adjustment of the macroeconomic policy setting is war-
ranted. In particular, a more ambitious budgetary adjust-
ment in 2006 and 2007 in line with the preventive arm of
the Stability and Growth Pact is desirable in view of the
improved economic and employment situation. 
A dynamic and smooth functioning EMU (Chapter 3):
Although structural reforms offer benefits to all EU
Member States, euro area members have an added incen-
tive to enhance structural reform. In the first place, the
benefits of structural reform will accrue more quickly if
members of a monetary union open up product, labour
and capital markets in tandem. Furthermore, structural
reforms are essential for the smooth functioning of
EMU. For example, structural reforms to increase the
responsiveness of prices and wages to economic shocks
would help to reduce the unwarranted growth and infla-
tion differences in the euro area which, though not usu-
ally large, have nevertheless persisted in recent years.
Among the structural reforms that could help to promote
the smooth functioning of EMU are measures to remove
formal and informal mechanisms of wage indexation,
promote greater differentiation in minimum-wage legis-
lation, and ensure further liberalisation in network indus-
tries.
The external dimension (Chapter 4): At the European
Council at Vienna in December 1998, EU leaders agreed
that the euro area should speak with one voice on issues
of particular relevance to EMU. Since the launch of the
euro, limited progress has been made in achieving this
goal, with the result that the euro area’s representation
in international financial institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund, International Monetary
and Financial Committee, the G7 finance ministers
meetings and the G20 lacks coherence. These shortcom-
ings make it difficult for the euro area to show leadership
on global economic challenges, such as the need to pro-
mote an orderly adjustment to the large current-account
imbalances that have built up in the global economy. The
euro area can show global economic leadership by
encouraging, inter alia, a gradual shift in global demand
from regions with current-account deficits to regions
with current-account surpluses. Within the euro area,
enhanced economic reforms can help the economy to be
more responsive to external economic shocks. 
61. Macroeconomic developments and outlook
1. Following a relatively mild downturn in 2001–03,
the euro area economy experienced a comparatively
slow recovery. A key factor here has been weak domestic
demand, which has lagged behind the average level
experienced in previous downturns. The outlook for
2006 is brighter with the economic recovery expected to
accelerate. Supported by strong investment, signs of
greater confidence among consumers and a buoyant
world economy, euro area GDP is expected to grow by
2.1 % in 2006, with 1 million new jobs being created. 
1.1. The economic recovery in context
2. The economic downturn experienced by the euro
area in 2001–03 was relatively mild when compared with
past experience. A comparison of the last three major
downturns in the euro area shows that all started from a
positive output gap of around 2 %. In the downturn of the
early 1980s, the output gap reached a trough of – 2.7 %
four years into the slowdown, while during the downturn
of the early 1990s, it reached a trough of – 1.7 %. In the
most recent downturn, the output gap has remained above
– 1 % in the five years following the slowdown. 
3. The current recovery of the euro area economy
has been relatively sluggish compared with past eco-
nomic performance. When measured against the aver-
age performance of output during the past four recover-
ies, the expansion of economic activity in the euro area
has remained more subdued during the current cycle,
which started in mid-2003. The pick-up of economic
activity was much more vigorous during the recoveries
of 1982 and 1987. The early stages of the current expan-
sion phase were more comparable with the recoveries
which began in 1993 and 1999. However, in the second
half of 2004, the euro area business cycle lost ground
even to these milder economic expansions. The net result
is that, at the end of 2005, 10 quarters after the beginning
of the last expansion, euro area output was about 2.9 %
lower than the average level recorded during the previ-
ous four recoveries (Graph 1.1).
4. The sluggish performance of Italy, Germany and
the Netherlands appears to be a key factor in explain-
ing aggregate developments at the euro area level
(Table 1.1). With the exception of Spain, output remains
lower than the average level recorded for the previous
recoveries 10 quarters after the current recovery started
in the largest euro area countries. The size of this gap
ranges from 0.1 % in France to 0.6 % in the Netherlands. 
1.2. Factors weighing on the economic 
recovery
5. There are a number of possible explanations of
the euro area’s slow economic recovery. It may be
linked to the relative shallowness of the 2001 slowdown
compared with previous downturns and thus be of a
cyclical nature. It may also indicate a slowdown in
potential growth, suggesting that structural explanations
may be behind the euro area’s sluggish performance.
Empirical estimates by the Commission suggest that less
than half of the growth shortfall can be attributed to
lower potential growth. The main reason for the euro
area’s slow economic recovery appears to be the cyclical
weakness in domestic demand. 
6. Total investment in the euro area has so far been
disappointing compared with past recoveries. Ten quar-
ters after the beginning of the 2003 expansion, the level
of gross fixed capital formation was around 3 % below
the average level recorded during the previous four
recoveries (Graph 1.2). This low level of investment
expenditure is due not only to cyclical factors i.e. weak
domestic demand but also to structural factors. In par-
ticular, financial overstretching by the corporate sector
in the late 1990s and concerns over the slowdown in the
deceleration of the pace of technical progress registered
in the euro area both appear to have dampened invest-
ment during the economic recovery. In Germany, the
long-lasting adjustment to the significant construction
oversupply in the wake of unification shows up in the
investment figures for the euro area as a whole. 
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7. The current economic recovery has also been
marked by weak private consumption. Two and a half
years after the beginning of the 2003 expansion, the level
of private consumption was around 2.8 % below the
average level recorded during the previous four recover-
ies (Graph 1.2). Weak private consumption is linked, in
part, to the relatively high level of saving. The saving
ratio rose during the period of strong growth (2000–01)
and stabilised during the downturn which followed.
Concerns about the sustainability of public pension and
healthcare systems are likely to have kept the saving
ratio high and have more than offset the downward pres-
sure on saving exerted by EMU via lower interest rates
and financial liberalisation. Uncertainties over the
effects of economic reforms may also have weighed on
consumption expenditure.
8. Slow employment growth during the economic
recovery has also dampened private consumption. The
euro area labour market has proved more resilient in the
last economic slowdown compared to earlier cycles.
Employment growth remained positive throughout the
Graph 1.1 Comparison to previous recoveries: GDP
(1)  Starting 2003Q3.
(2) Starting 1982Q4, 1978Q1, 1993Q2, 1999Q1, respectively.
Source: Commission services.
Table 1.1
Growth of GDP components in the current and previous recoveries in selected Member States
Previous recoveries % Current recovery % Cumulative growth differentials pp.
Germany 0.7 0.3 3.8
France 0.6 0.5 1.7
Italy 0.7 0.2 5.8
Spain 0.8 0.8 0.2
Netherlands 1.0 0.4 5.7
Quarter-on-quarter average growth rate in the ﬁrst 10 quarters following the trough. Cumulative growth differentials over the same period.
Source: Commission services.
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downturn and the rise in unemployment was limited, with
the unemployment rate peaking at 8.9 % in the fourth quar-
ter of 2004. However, the more limited response in the
labour market in the downturn has been followed by a
similarly more tempered response in the subsequent eco-
nomic upturn. 
1.3. A more positive growth outlook 
for 2006
9. After the protracted period of slow recovery, eco-
nomic growth is expected to accelerate in the euro area
in 2006. According to the European Commission’s
spring economic forecast, which was released on 8 May,
GDP growth is expected to pick up to 2.1 this year (1).
The dispersion of annual growth rates across euro area
Member States remains significant. In 2006, Finland,
Greece, Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg are expected to
post growth rates of more than 3 %, whilst Portugal is
expected to see output growth of below 1 %. 
10. The euro area’s economic recovery is under-
pinned by a strengthening of domestic demand, parti-
cularly investment. In 2006, total investment is expected
to grow by 4.2 %, over 1 percentage point higher than
expected in the previous forecast. This pickup in invest-
ment is due to historically low interest rates, improved
corporate balance sheets, wider profit margins and an
increasing need for replacement investment. Construc-
tion investment is expected to be strong in 2006, driven
by the positive outlook in Germany.
11.  The outlook for consumption in the euro area in
2006 is for a modest upturn. The European Commis-
sion’s latest forecast foresees an increase in household
consumption expenditure of 1.7 % this year — around
0.3 percentage points higher than expected in the previous
forecast. This is consistent with consumer surveys, which
have shown a gradual but sustained rise in confidence
since the middle of last year. This confidence is due, in
part, to the positive impact of the economic recovery on
labour market conditions in the euro area (see below).
12. The euro area’s economic recovery is also being
helped by the continued strong expansion of world output
and trade (see Graph 1.3). In 2006, world GDP growth
will remain steady at 4.6 %, only â of a percentage point
lower than the record high attained in 2004. Robust global
growth has been particularly pronounced in manufactur-
ing, and strong overall performances by China, India,
Japan and the USA have played an important role.   
Graph 1.2 Investment and consumption during the current and past recoveries
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ The full details of the European Commission’s spring economic forecast
for 2006 are available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
index_en.htm 
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13. The strong growth in world output has gone
hand in hand with a healthy increase in world trade.
In 2006, world trade growth is projected to be in the
vicinity of 8 %. Exports from the euro area to the rest of
the world area are forecast to grow by 5â % in 2006 —
around half a percentage point higher than expected in
the previous forecast. Imports are projected to outpace
exports in 2006, but this trend is expected to be reversed
thereafter. As a result, the contribution of the external
side to growth will still be negative in 2006, but is
expected to turn positive next year.
14.  At the Member State level, the competitiveness of
exporters in markets outside the euro area has changed
Graph 1.3 Growth of world trade and GDP
Source: Commission services.
Graph 1.4 Headline and core inflation, euro area
Source: Commission services.
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markedly in recent years. Gains have been made, for
example, by Germany and Austria whilst competitive-
ness has deteriorated in Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and
Portugal. This implies that the degree to which countries
will be able to take advantage of the buoyant world
economy in 2006 may differ significantly.  
1.4. Inflation outlook and the impact 
of high oil prices 
15. Oil prices have recently reached record high lev-
els, with a barrel of Brent crude oil costing almost USD
70 in late June. Robust growth in global demand, low
spare capacity, disruptions to oil production in Nigeria
and geopolitical uncertainty surrounding Iran and Iraq
are all factors behind the surge in prices.
16. The Commission’s forecast expects oil prices to
remain high over the forecast period. It is assumed that
the price of Brent will average USD 68.9 per barrel in
2006, in line with the profile suggested by futures prices.
This corresponds to an increase in the average annual
price of 27.4 % compared to 2005. 
17. Against the backdrop, the Commission expects
consumer price inflation to remain at 2.2 % in the euro
area in 2006 (Graph 1.3). This view is based on the evi-
dence that, thus far, marked increases in oil and energy
prices have not led to significant indirect effects on the
harmonised index of consumer prices (see Box 1.1 for a
more detailed discussion). Moreover, core inflation, i.e.
consumer price inflation excluding energy and unpro-
cessed food continued to decline in 2005 and stood at
1.5 % in May 2006 (Graph 1.4). The dispersion of
annual inflation rates across euro area Member States
remains a source of concern. In 2006, the gap between
the highest and lowest inflation countries is expected to
be 2.7 percentage points (see Chapter 3). 
1.5. Outlook for the euro area labour 
market
18.  Employment growth in the euro area is expected
to improve this year in line with the predicted accelera-
tion in the economic recovery. According to the Com-
mission’s spring economic forecast, total employment
will grow by 0.9 % in 2006. Although this is the highest
rate of employment growth in the euro area since 2001,
it is nevertheless below the 1.1 % growth rate expected
in the Commission’s autumn economic forecast. This
downward revision reflects, inter alia, the rise of tempo-
rary jobs and part-time employment and the effect of
one-off country-specific factors on employment growth
in 2005. 
Table 1.2
Euro area growth components, 2006
% change on previous year
Spring forecast 2006 Autumn forecast 2005
GDP 2.1 1.9
Private consumption 1.7 1.4
Government consumption 2.0 2.0
Gross ﬁxed capital formation 4.2 3.1
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.6 0.5
Exports of goods and services 5.4 5.0
Imports of goods and services 6.0 5.0
contribution to change in GDP (% point)
1.0 0.8
Government consumption 0.4 0.4
Gross ﬁxed capital formation 0.9 0.6
Changes in inventories 0.0 0.0
Net exports – 0.2 – 0.1
Source: Commission services.
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19. Although the euro area is expected to create over
1 million new jobs this year, the decline in unemploy-
ment will be limited to around 100 000 persons. This is
because of the traditional influx of persons into the
labour force when the labour market situation improves
(and latent job-seekers return to the regular labour mar-
ket in active search of employment). The unemployment
rate is therefore expected to decline only modestly to
8.4 % of the labour force in the euro area in 2006.
1.6. Risks to the economic recovery
20. At this juncture, the short-term risks to the euro
area’s continued economic recovery appear to be fairly
balanced. On the internal side, there are both upside and
downside risks, while on the external side, negative risks
appear to be increasing over time. 
21. On the internal side, improving labour-market
conditions and the effects of past or ongoing structural
reforms could spur consumer confidence by more than
expected. This would trigger a release of pent-up
demand which has accumulated in the household sector
and which could be realised through a reduction in the
savings rate. On the other hand, while not a problem for
the euro area or the EU as a whole, house prices seem to
be stretched in some Member States and could pose a
downside risk in these countries, especially if the price
corrections are not gradual.
22. There are positive and negative risks to continued
investment growth in the euro area. Positive risks arise
from stronger growth of specific construction markets,
stronger-than-expected external demand or higher pro-
ductivity as a result of past IT-investments and reforms.
Negative risks include higher oil prices, a disappointing
development of aggregate demand and entrenched low-
growth expectations.
23. An additional risk to domestic demand is the
uncertainty surrounding the impact of budgetary con-
solidation in the euro area’s largest economy, Ger-
many. The Commission’s economic forecast expects
Box 1.1: The impact of oil prices on the euro area economy
The Commission’s macroeconomic model (Quest II) has been used to simulate the effects of a permanent USD 10 rise in oil
prices from USD 60 to USD 70 per barrel, roughly in line with the change assumed in the spring economic forecast. GDP growth
in the euro area would be lowered by 0.3 percentage points in the first year, and by 0.1 percentage points in the second and third
years. Consumer price inflation would be 0.2 percentage points higher in the first and second year.
On the basis of these results, it appears that the negative economic consequences of higher oil prices are smaller today than in
previous episodes of sharply rising oil prices. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, high oil prices are partly due to strong
demand for oil as a consequence of high global GDP growth. Secondly, the energy intensity of the advanced economies has
decreased. Thirdly, increased competition in the tradable sector, due to globalisation and European economic integration, and the
lower degree of wage indexation helps to curb the inflationary impact of higher oil prices. Finally, macroeconomic policies have
improved, with clear price stability responsibility entrusted to independent central banks. 
Table 
EU-12 Permanent oil price shock USD 10 (+ 17 %) (baseline USD 60)
Year 1 2 3 4 5
GDP – 0.27 – 0.39 – 0.45 – 0.47 – 0.49
GDP growth – 0.27 – 0.11 – 0.06 – 0.03 – 0.01
Consumer price level 0.19 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.29
Consumer price inﬂation 0.19 0.19 – 0.03 – 0.03 – 0.03
NB: percentage (points) difference from baseline (i.e. oil price USD 60).
Source: Commission services.
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German households to bring forward some purchases of
durable consumer goods in anticipation of the VAT
increase. As a result, private consumption is projected to
increase strongly in 2006 and to fall slightly in 2007.
Overall, the impact of the VAT increase on growth
should be neutral. However, it cannot be excluded that
the reaction of economic agents to the government’s
consolidation package may be different than expected,
with effects on GDP growth in Germany and the euro
area.
24. On the external side, despite some easing since
last autumn, oil and energy prices remain exception-
ally high and volatile. With continuous high demand,
the market remains vulnerable to supply disruptions.
Price increases above those already assumed can thus
not be ruled out and continue to be one of the main risks
to the economic recovery. By the same token, if oil
prices currently contain a high risk premium due to geo-
political tensions, an easing of these tensions could also
imply the possibility of a decline in oil prices.
25. The risk of a disorderly unwinding of global
imbalances remains a threat to world growth. The
exceptionally large and persistent global current account
imbalances have led to fears of disruptive exchange rate
realignments, with significant global implications. Fur-
thermore, the gradual withdrawal of monetary stimulus
across world regions could affect financial markets more
adversely than is usually assumed. The rapid growth in
highly complex financial instruments, such as credit
derivatives, and its potential impact on the stability of
the international financial system, is an additional source
of concern.
26. A stronger-than-expected adjustment of con-
sumer behaviour in the USA as a consequence of a
sharper-than-expected correction in the US housing
market cannot be ruled out. However, the strong
momentum in the world economy and the buoyancy in
many survey indicators also imply some upside risks to
the world economy, especially on the shorter horizon. In
addition to the USA, a stronger-than-expected consoli-
dation of the recovery in Japan presents an upside risk.
27. A further risk reflects the continued concern
about a possible global pandemic originating from an
avian flu. However, the likelihood and the severity of a
pandemic are extremely difficult to assess with any sig-
nificant degree of confidence.
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2. The macroeconomic policy setting
28. An adjustment of macroeconomic policies in
view of the changing economic situation and out-
look is warranted. Now that the recovery is becom-
ing more firmly established, the stimulus provided by
monetary policy is being gradually withdrawn.
Against the background of a more favourable outlook
for growth, it now appears necessary to step up fiscal
consolidation to improve budgetary sustainability in
the light of still-high levels of public deficits and debt
and the expected surge in public expenditures
because of the ageing population. Adopting a ‘wait
and see’ attitude at this juncture would imply post-
poning improvements in structural balances until
economic conditions are less favourable and budget-
ary consolidation is harder to implement. It is essen-
tial that fiscal consolidation goes hand in hand with
growth and jobs by re-directing the composition of
public expenditure towards growth-enhancing cate-
gories.
29. The overall aim of macroeconomic policy in the
euro area is to keep output close to potential, whilst
preserving price stability. Sound policymaking con-
sists of a clear medium-term strategy as well as ade-
quate short-term responses. The medium-term strat-
egy minimises the uncertainty of households and
businesses about future macroeconomic policies and
encourages consumption and investment decisions
which in turn are supportive of stability and growth.
The short-term responsiveness of policies is essential
as economic circumstances change continuously. Pol-
icymakers must remain alert and be prepared to adjust
their policy instruments if and when the need arises.
To give an analogy, it could be said that the medium-
term objective of macroeconomic policies is to get the
cruise control right. The short-term objective is to
accelerate or brake at the right moment and to the
right degree. This chapter looks at monetary and fiscal
policy from both a medium-term and short-term per-
spective.
2.1.  Monetary policy: gradual withdrawal 
of the stimulus
Monetary conditions remain accommodating
30. Monetary policy has played an important role in
the euro area’s economic recovery. Following the decline
in economic activity since the cyclical peak in 2000, mon-
etary policy has helped to spur economic activity and pro-
mote confidence through historically low nominal and
real interest rates. Indeed, short-term interest rates have
been much more accommodative in recent years than they
were during previous economic downturns. For example,
following the recent slowdown, real short-term interest
rates were considerably lower than was the case following
the recessions of 1979–80 and 1992–93 (Graph 2.1). 
31. Interest rates are still low from a historical per-
spective and lower than most estimates of a neutral rate.
After lowering its policy rate by 275 basis points between
2001 and 2003, the ECB left its policy rate unchanged for
more than two years. The three recent hikes in the policy
rate — on 1 December 2005, 2 March and 8 June 2006 —
were the first increases since October 2000, bringing the
ECB’s main policy rate to 2.75 % (Graph 2.2). The rate
hikes should help to anchor medium- to long-term infla-
tion expectations, which recently have increased
slightly. Despite these rate hikes, nominal and real short-
term interest rates remain low by historical standards.
For comparison, the lowest level of nominal interest
rates ever attained by the German Bundesbank was
2.5 %. The current level of interest rates is still below
plausible measures of a neutral level for the euro area,
which has fallen significantly during the last decade.
Long-term interest rates experienced a sustained down-
ward trend until late 2005, reaching levels last seen in the
heyday of the gold standard. Since the end of 2005, how-
ever, bond yields have gradually increased by around
100 basis points but are still low from a historical per-
spective. These low interest rates, which are a global
phenomenon, have sparked off a search for yield.
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Spreads between high-risk and low-risk investments
have been dwarfed so that a misallocation of resources
may have taken place — recent developments suggest
that some correction may be taking place.
32. Exchange-rate developments have had a bearing
on monetary conditions in the euro area (Graph 2.3).
This can be seen from the evolution of the real effective
exchange rate (REER), which measures the real value
(i.e. the value corrected by a price deflator such as con-
sumer price inflation) of the euro relative to the curren-
cies of the euro area’s main trading partners. In 2005, the
REER depreciated, having a loosening effect on mone-
tary conditions. This trend has been reversed in the first
Graph 2.1 Short-term (three-month) real interest rates
Source: Commission services.
Graph 2.2 ECB policy rate (nominal and short-term real interest rates)
Source: Commission services.
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half of 2006. These changes in the REER are due, in part,
to swings in the euro–dollar exchange rate that saw the
euro lose some 15 % against the US dollar in nominal
terms in the course of 2005, before appreciating by 8 %
between February and June 2006 (see Chapter 4 for a
more detailed discussion of exchange-rate develop-
ments).
33.  Overall, monetary conditions have remained
relatively accommodative. A commonly used indicator
for assessing monetary developments is the monetary
conditions index (MCI) which is calculated as a
weighted average of the real short-term interest rate and
the real effective exchange rate relative to their value in
a base period. As a rule, the weights reflect the relative
effects of these variables on aggregate demand. An
examination of the MCI shows that recent monetary con-
ditions have been relatively accommodative (Graph 2.3). 
34.  Ample liquidity poses inflation risk. Empirical
evidence shows that prolonged periods of high inflation
have always been associated with high monetary growth.
Over the last years, there has been clear evidence of
exceptional liquidity growth in the global economy.
Quantitative measures such as the monetary base, broad
money and credit to the private sector have increased
substantially. In the euro area, M3 growth has acceler-
ated rapidly over the last year. Private-sector credit
growth, loans to households for house purchase and
loans to non-bank financial institutions are at their high-
est levels since 2001. At the current juncture, stronger
monetary growth has been driven by low interest rates as
reflected in the strong increase of the most liquid compo-
nents of M3 and the increasing demand for loans. This is
an important difference relative to earlier periods of
strong money growth. For example, between 2001 and
2003, when monetary growth was comparable to today’s
rate, the main driver was sizeable portfolio shifts into
money, seen as a safe haven at a time of heightened
uncertainty. At present, stronger monetary dynamics can
no longer be interpreted as reflecting heightened finan-
cial and economic uncertainties. To avoid strong mone-
tary dynamics ultimately finding their way through to
higher prices of goods and services, there is a need to
closely monitor monetary developments.
35. Inflation rates have stayed close to but above the
2 % ceiling. Consumer price inflation has come down
from rates of around 7 % in the 1980s and above 4 % in
the early 1990s to slightly above 2 % in recent years
(Graph 2.4). However, core inflation (which excludes
volatile components, such as unprocessed food and
energy prices) is still below 1.5 %. Long-term inflation
expectations are below 2 %, while short-term expecta-
tions are slightly above 2 %. Inflation rates differ
between Member States: the difference between the
highest and lowest rates of inflation in the euro area
stood at 3 percentage points in 2005. While inflation
Graph 2.3 Monetary conditions index
Source: Commission services.
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differentials in large monetary unions are a normal phe-
nomenon, their persistence among some euro area Mem-
ber States is worrying (see Chapter 3).
36. The euro area’s economic recovery has coincided
with a remarkable degree of wage moderation. In 2005,
harmonised wage indicators show that low nominal
wage growth has prevailed in the euro area (Graph 2.5).
The annual growth rate of compensation per employee
was the same as that of consumer price inflation, leading
to virtually unchanged real wages in the euro area in
2005. The use of alternative price deflators confirms the
picture of very low real wage growth, albeit suggesting
small increases each year (Graph 2.6).
Graph 2.4 Inflation (actual and expected)
Source: Commission services.
Graph 2.5 Annual nominal wage growth in the euro area
Source: Commission services.
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37. Since wage growth and inflation were almost
equal in the euro area in 2005, wage moderation has
contributed to declining real unit labour costs. Indeed,
real unit labour costs have not increased on an annual
basis since the single currency was introduced. The com-
bination of a weakening in economic growth and a grad-
ual acceleration in employment growth in 2005 means
that labour productivity growth decelerated and there-
with unit labour costs declined by less than in the previ-
ous year. This behaviour of labour productivity seems to
be largely a reflection of cyclical movements, namely
the lagged response of employment in 2005 to the accel-
eration of GDP growth in 2004. The change in trend unit
labour costs suggests that a further, albeit small, deceler-
ation took place in 2005, which largely reversed the rela-
tion of actual and trend unit labour costs recorded in
2004. Overall, it appears that real unit labour costs in the
euro area have remained on a downward path.
38. Market forces as well as the behaviour of social
partners in collective bargaining have contributed to
continuously moderate wage growth in the euro area.
According to the ECB’s indicator of negotiated wages,
the wage increase agreed in collective bargaining was
2.1 % in 2005, the same rate as the year before. Although
the economic recovery is likely to fuel calls for wage
increases, continued moderation is essential. In the first
place, low wage growth can help to reduce inflationary
pressures that may jeopardise the economic recovery.
Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 3, promoting employ-
ment growth through wage moderation is justified
against the backdrop of high and persistent unemploy-
ment of well above 8 %. 
Market participants expect a further tightening 
of monetary conditions 
39. Over the long term, low inflation rates in indus-
trialised economies should not be taken for granted.
Some economists have argued that inflation rates in
industrial countries have come down permanently
because of intensifying competition from countries with
low production costs such as China and India or because
of the credibility that central banks have acquired in
delivering price stability. If this view is correct, excess
liquidity is likely to feed into asset prices rather than con-
sumer prices with the potential risk of asset price bubbles
and subsequent busts. Although globalisation is likely to
have exerted downward pressure on prices in some
cases, the opposite is also true in other cases. For exam-
ple, the rapid economic growth of China and India and
the resulting extra demand for primary products has con-
tributed to increases in the prices of energy and other pri-
mary products. Moreover, asset prices, in particular
equity and housing prices, have continued to rise, but —
at the euro area level — the risk of bubbles so far seems
low. Nevertheless, the excess liquidity and the potential
build-up of risks deserve to be closely monitored.
Graph 2.6 Real wage growth with different price deflators, euro area
Source: Commission services.
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40. From a short-term perspective, risks to price
stability are currently on the upside. Euro area infla-
tion was 2.5 % in May. Despite the three recent inter-
est rate hikes, monetary and financial conditions in
the euro area have remained accommodative. As dis-
cussed above, both short-term and long-term interest
rates are still very low by historical standards, and the
monetary conditions index (MCI) suggests that the
monetary stance is still accommodative. This is con-
firmed by other indicators. The annual growth of
money (M3) remains at a high level and growth rates
of the most liquid components have even increased
further in recent months. Moreover, credit growth is
strong and asset prices, in particular equity and hous-
ing prices, have continued to rise.
41. Market participants expect a further tightening
of monetary conditions. Market expectations as
derived from futures contracts now fully price in
another two hikes by 25 basis points each before the
end of the year. A high probability is also given to
another hike during 2007. Furthermore, the possibility
of a continued appreciation of the euro’s REER as a
result of, inter alia, an unwinding of global imbal-
ances, could weigh on monetary conditions (See
Chapter 4 for a more in-depth treatment of this issue). 
2.2. Fiscal policy: consolidation needed 
in most Member States 
42. Fiscal policies remain the responsibility of indi-
vidual Member States but the Treaty and the Stability
and Growth Pact set out general requirements for the
conduct of prudent national budgetary policies. This is
because sound fiscal policies are essential for the success
of a single monetary policy. Over the medium and long
term, this framework helps to promote sustainable public
finances and certainty about their evolution. Once sound
budgetary positions have been secured, governments
would be able to let the automatic stabilisers work fully
during downswings and upturns so as to smoothen fluc-
tuations in economic activity in the short run (1). 
43. Member States can also make a positive contribu-
tion to economic growth by improving the quality of
their public finances. Public finances in the euro area
represent about half of the economy and, therefore, the
way in which public budgets are spent and financed has
significant implications for the attainment of the Lisbon
Graph 2.7 Real unit labour costs, euro area
NB: Trend unit labour costs are calculated with trend labour productivity, which was derived with a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ A detailed examination of Member States’ fiscal policies and the revised
Stability and Growth Pact are presented in the Commission’s report ‘Pub-
lic finances in EMU — 2006’. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publi-
cations/european_economy/public_finances2006_en.htm
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agenda objectives in terms of growth and employment.
As decreases in interest payments fade out, the resources
for redirecting spending towards growth-enhancing
items will need to be found in other categories of public
expenditure, for which those of transfers and consump-
tion are by far the largest. Country experiences show that
Member States that succeed in maintaining fiscal disci-
pline have been able to reallocate public resources in a
more adequate manner. Furthermore, countries that have
been at the forefront of institutional reforms, by intro-
ducing national expenditure rules and performance
budgeting schemes within a medium-term framework,
manage better to redirect public spending towards their
expenditure priorities. 
Medium-term objective crucial in light of high 
current debt and ageing population
44. One reason to improve the sustainability of public
finances is that the euro area is already burdened with a
too high level of debt. The average debt-to-GDP ratio is
just above 70 % and seven out of 12 Member States have
debt levels above the 60 % of GDP reference value of the
Treaty (Graph 2.8). Against this background, the
reformed Stability and Growth Pact requires Member
States to set medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs)
which should guide the formation and implementation of
yearly budgets. The higher the current debt ratio of a
Member State, the more ambitious this MTO needs to be.
45. Another pressing reason to improve the sustaina-
bility of public finances is the additional budgetary pres-
sure that will stem from the ageing of the euro area’s
population. The old-age dependency ratio is projected to
double in the coming decades: in the euro area of today,
there are four people of working-age for every elderly citi-
zen; in the euro area of the future, the ratio will be only
two to one. This puts pressure on public finances in two
ways: the ageing population (i) significantly lowers the
euro area’s growth potential and (ii) substantially raises
age-related public expenditures (1). The potential growth
rate in the euro area between 2031 and 2050 is estimated
to be 1.3 %, which is roughly half of its potential growth
rate today. In addition, public expenditures will increase
significantly. With an ageing population, governments
typically spend substantially more on pensions, healthcare
and long-term care. This is only to a minor extent compen-
sated by lower expenses on education and unemployment
benefits (Graph 2.9). Overall, the euro area’s public
expenditure in 2050 is expected to be 3.7 % of GDP
higher than in 2004 on the basis of existing policies on
¥1∂ See ‘The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25
Member States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and
unemployment transfers (2004–50)’. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
publications/european_economy/2006/eespecialreport0106_en.htm
Graph 2.8 Gross debt (% of GDP, 2005 (1))
(1) Spring economic forecast 2006.
Source: Commission services.
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these expenditures. There are, however, substantial differ-
ences in the budgetary challenges of different Member
States, which mainly reflect different demographics and
diverse arrangements for public pensions. To cope with
the expected future surge in public expenditures, govern-
ments need to consolidate their public finances now and
take structural measures to alleviate budgetary pressures
associated with ageing populations (see Chapter 3). 
46. The obtainment of the medium-term budgetary
objectives is crucial. If Member States fail to undertake
the budgetary adjustment foreseen in the latest update of
their stability programmes, the euro area’s debt level will
increase sharply because of the current levels of deficits
and future higher expenditures on pensions, healthcare
and long-term care (Graph 2.10). This underlines the
need for a strict adherence to MTOs so as to reduce debt
levels. At this stage, only four out of 12 Member States
of the euro area have attained their MTO (Graph 2.11).
In most Member States, there is still a significant gap
between their MTO established in the 2005 update of
their stability programmes and their current structural
balances (i.e. the cyclically adjusted balance, excluding
one-offs and other temporary measures).
Fiscal consolidation is needed in most Member States 
47. As in the case of monetary policy, fiscal policy has
been supportive of economic growth in the euro area
during the recent economic downturn. In this respect,
the euro area has benefited from automatic budgetary
stabilisers which, due to the larger size of governments,
and the progressiveness of the tax system, are roughly
twice as large as in the USA. Discretionary fiscal policy
has also been accommodative. In 2001 and 2002, the fis-
cal policy stance, which can be approximated by changes
in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB), was
loosened as the euro area’s CAPB declined more than
0.5 % per year (Graph 2.12). In 2003 and 2004, the fiscal
policy stance was broadly neutral (absolute changes in
the CAPB below 0.5 %). Only in 2005 was there a tight-
ening of the fiscal policy stance (positive change in the
CAPB of 0.6 %). By contrast, the fiscal policy stance
was tightened continuously in the previous economic
downturn which reflects the fiscal consolidation in the
run-up to the euro. A similar pattern emerges for the
downturn following the 1979 peak. Thus, fiscal policy
has clearly been more supportive of the economy in the
most recent downturn than in the previous two.
48. In view of the economic recovery and the urgent
need to consolidate, the progress made in 2005 should
not be wasted. In 2005, the fiscal stance improved due to
better-than-expected revenues. Against the background
of a broadly recognised need to put public finances on a
more sustainable footing, the pace of fiscal consolidation
over the next years should be stepped up, taking advan-
Graph 2.9 Changes in age-related public expenditure vis-à-vis year 2004 (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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tage of the current window of opportunity. However,
Graph 2.13, which depicts the budgetary developments
in relation to cyclical conditions, shows that the euro
area fiscal stance is projected to experience a marginal
loosening in 2006, falling far short of the stability pro-
gramme objectives. This gives an indication of the fiscal
adjustment effort required in next year’s budget in order
to fully implement the preventive arm of the revised Sta-
bility and Growth Pact.
49.  More fiscal consolidation is needed in most
Member States but the amount of fiscal consolidation
required differs. Under the reformed Stability and
Growth Pact, Member States have committed
Graph 2.10 Debt development in the euro area, with and wihout medium-term consolidation
Source: Commission services.
Graph 2.11 Current structural balance and medium-term objective (MTO)
(1) Ireland has an MTO of ‘close to balance’, Finland’s MTO is ‘around 1.5 % of GDP’, the Netherlands has an MTO between – 0.5 % and – 1 % of GDP
and Portugal has an MTO of ‘at least – 0.5 % of GDP’.
Source: Commission services.
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themselves to improve their structural deficit by 0.5 % of
GDP annually as a benchmark if they have not yet
attained their MTO. In so-called good times, a greater
effort is required, while the adjustment effort may be
more limited in bad times. Now that economic and
employment conditions are improving (see Chapter 1),
an adjustment of at least 0.5 %, and possibly more,
would seem to be appropriate. By improving the quality
Graph 2.12 Cyclically adjusted primary balance
Source: Commission services.
Graph 2.13 Fiscal policy stance in the euro area
Source: Commission services.
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of their public finances, Member States can redirect their
public expenditures to finance economic reforms to
enhance growth and jobs so as to ensure that fiscal con-
solidation and microeconomic reforms are fully comple-
mentary and a positive contribution is made to growth.
The amount of fiscal consolidation needed differs
between Member States. In this context three groups can
be identified.
• For the Member States that have attained their MTO
the main objective for the short term should be to
avoid pro-cyclicality. These Member States are
expected to let automatic stabilisers work freely and
resist the temptation of fiscal loosening. The Com-
mission’s spring economic forecasts, which are
based on the budgetary measures that so far have
been approved in Member States, indicate a loosen-
ing of the fiscal policy in 2006 and 2007. Further
measures are to be considered to avoid this
(Graph 2.13).
• For the Member States with a deficit below 3 % of
GDP that have not reached their MTO, the short-
term objective should be to improve their structural
balance by at least 0.5 % per year. On the basis of
approved budgetary measures, the adjustment for
2006 and 2007 falls short of this threshold. So, the
Member States in this group are strongly encour-
aged to exercise further fiscal consolidation now,
taking advantage of the window of opportunity pro-
vided by the economic recovery.
• This applies even more strongly to the third group of
countries, i.e. the Member States with current
budget deficits above 3 % of GDP. The adjustments
so far approved for 2006 and 2007 are below the
0.5 % threshold, requiring further fiscal consolida-
tion to contribute clearly towards the correction of
excessive deficits.
50. Measures for fiscal consolidation should not be
postponed as there is a considerable time lag between a
change in fiscal policy and its effect on the economy. A
‘wait and see’ attitude could mean delaying improve-
ments in structural balances until economic conditions
are less favourable, hence making budgetary consolida-
tion harder to implement. The previous cyclical upturn
illustrates that this is a real danger. In the years 1999–
2001, the fiscal policy stance was loosened leading to
pro-cyclicality. Had the euro area then consolidated its
public finances, we would have had lower debt levels
and thus a better budgetary position today.    
51. Although budgetary consolidation could weigh
on domestic demand in the short term, this should be
balanced against the positive effects of greater budget-
ary stability on the euro area’s economic outlook. More
Graph 2.14 Change in the structural balance of euro area Member States
Source: Commission services.
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ambitious fiscal consolidation is likely to contain infla-
tionary pressures in the euro area and thus to reduce or
postpone the need for a tightening of monetary policy. In
this way, fiscal consolidation could actually promote pri-
vate investment and thus stimulate growth. Moreover,
there is a clear relationship between household savings
and the budget deficit: when governments spend less
(i.e. lower their budget deficit), households tend to spend
more (i.e. lower their savings rate) (Graph 2.15). Up to
now, private consumption in the euro area has been quite
weak (see Chapter 1). Uncertainty about pensions com-
bined with the already high level of debt may well have
encouraged households to save more. Governments that
work actively on the sustainability of their public finance
and on structural reform may thus boost confidence and
thereby encourage households to consume more. 
2.3. Conclusions
52. EMU’s policy framework has contributed to a very
favourable macroeconomic policy mix. The combination
of a credible monetary authority and a commitment to
sound budgetary policies has led to low interest rates and
given greater scope for automatic budgetary stabilisers to
operate, with the result that macroeconomic policy has
been much more supportive than in recent downturns.
Nevertheless, the economic performance of the euro area
in recent years has been disappointing. Economic growth
has been sluggish, unemployment high and the economic
recovery has been much slower in comparison with previ-
ous recoveries in the euro area and recent recoveries in
other industrialised economies, such as the USA.    
53.  On the whole, macroeconomic policy does not
appear to have been less accommodative in the euro
area than in the USA (Graphs 2.16 and 2.17). Although
the US Federal Reserve’s response to the 2001–03
downturn entailed a bigger cut in short-term interest
rates compared with the ECB, this should be seen in the
context of a larger deterioration in the output gap in the
US economy. Moreover, reflecting the different speed of
the economic recovery, the ECB has thus far increased
its main policy rate by considerably less than the US
Federal Reserve, leaving the ECB rate well below that of
the Federal Reserve at present. Similarly, although the
decrease in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance
(CAPB) in the period 1999–2002 was higher in the USA
than in the euro area, their fiscal stance (measured by the
change in the CAPB) was comparable in 2003–05. Fur-
thermore, the fact that the euro area’s automatic budget-
ary stabilisers are roughly twice as large as in the USA
means that a comparison of the levels of cyclically
adjusted balances does not tell the full story. Finally,
account should be taken of the fact that budget balances
and debt levels in the euro area were generally much less
sound than in the USA at the onset of the slowdown,
thereby limiting the scope for easing without compro-
mising long-run sustainability. 
Graph 2.15 Household savings and fiscal deficit in the euro area
Source: Commission services.
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54. As the economic situation improves in the euro
area, an adjustment in the macroeconomic policy set-
ting is warranted. As discussed above, a gradual with-
drawal of the stimulus provided by monetary policy has
been appropriate. Indeed, the ECB has raised its policy
rate in three steps of 25 basis points each since December
2005. Financial markets have already priced in further
action in the course of this year and next. In the area of
fiscal policy, the opportunity should be seized upon to
undertake the necessary fiscal consolidation. Fiscal con-
Graph 2.16 Policy mix and growth in the euro area
(1) Cyclically adjusted primary balance.
Source: OECD.
Graph 2.17 Policy mix and growth in the USA
(1) Cyclically adjusted primary balance.
Source: OECD
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solidation is essential in the light of the high level of pub-
lic debt and the expected surge in public expenditures
because of the ageing population. Fiscal consolidation is
also appropriately timed, as economic and employment
conditions in the euro area are improving. 
55. Due regard should be given to the interactions
between monetary and fiscal policies. In the first
instance, monetary and fiscal policies contribute to an
overall macroeconomic stance that can be more or less
supportive of the economic environment. During an eco-
nomic downturn, the challenge is to trigger a macroeco-
nomic response that is supportive of recovery, but which
contains inflationary pressures once economic growth
resumes. At the current economic juncture, the challenge
is to avoid inflationary risks and to undertake a budget-
ary consolidation without jeopardising the economic
recovery. Appropriate fiscal policies can, by reducing
the variability of GDP growth rates and favouring higher
potential growth, create conditions in which monetary
policy can more easily achieve its goals. During an eco-
nomic upturn, the avoidance of overly lax budgetary
policies can give greater scope for an accommodative
monetary stance. Likewise, during an economic down-
turn, a credible commitment to preserve budgetary sta-
bility and, if necessary, undertake budgetary consolida-
tion, should make it easier for monetary policy to quell
inflationary pressures in a gradual manner. This, in turn,
will make it easier for budgetary authorities to push
through the necessary fiscal packages. 
56. It is also essential to ensure greater coherence
between macroeconomic and microeconomic policies in
the euro area. For example, without policies to safeguard
macroeconomic stability, the lower cost and price pres-
sures from structural reforms will not translate into perma-
nently lower prices. Similarly, without greater liberalisa-
tion in the retail banking sector, the benefits of the
historically low interest rates resulting from EMU’s sound
macroeconomic framework cannot be fully reaped and the
transmission of interest-rate changes will be less smooth.
The need for coherence between macroeconomic and
microeconomic policies underlines the important role
played by the Eurogroup and the EU’s macroeconomic
dialogue in promoting consensus between policy authori-
ties on shared structural reform challenges. 
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3. A dynamic and smooth functioning EMU
57. Structural reforms in product, labour and capital
markets are essential to complete the new policy frame-
work of EMU. They are important for achieving higher
growth and more jobs: according to a study by the Euro-
pean Commission, comprehensive economic reforms in
product, labour and capital markets could raise potential
growth in the EU from 2 % to 3 % (1). But reforms are
also necessary to ensure a smooth adjustment to chang-
ing economic circumstances. Reforms that make prices
and wages more responsive to economic shocks will
help to reduce unwarranted cross-country growth and
inflation differences and to contribute to an orderly
unwinding of global imbalances. There is a strong incen-
tive for euro area members to coordinate their structural-
reform efforts. This is because the benefits of structural
reform will accrue more quickly if euro area countries
open up product, labour and capital markets in concert. 
3.1. The structural challenges 
of the euro area
58. The growth rates of GDP per capita in the euro
area and the USA have been fairly similar over the
period 1999–2005. During this period, euro area GDP
per capita (in constant prices) grew at the average annual
rate of 1.3 %, compared with a rate of 1.7 in the USA.
The relative closeness of these growth rates implies that
the relative level of GDP per capita as a measure of wel-
fare has remained fairly constant over time. In 2005, the
euro area’s GDP per capita stood at around 70 % of the
US level, slightly below the 1999 level.
59. However, there have been important changes in
the composition of the GDP gap. At the beginning of
EMU, two thirds of the gap was due to lower labour uti-
lisation while one third was caused by lower productiv-
ity per hour worked. Since then, it is notable that labour
utilisation in the euro area has improved relative to the
USA while the productivity level has worsened. In 2005,
the euro area employment rate reached 88 % of the US
rate, as compared with 82 % in 1999. Over the same
period, euro area productivity deteriorated from 92 % of
the US level to 87 %. Overall, this means that the euro
area’s gap in living standards with the USA is now attrib-
utable to lower utilisation of labour and productivity in
broadly equal shares. 
60. A similar picture emerges if the factors driving
growth rates in GDP per capita are examined. Graph
3.1 shows that the growth in GDP per capita in the euro
area was driven by employment increases of 0.5 % annu-
ally and average labour-productivity growth of 1.3 %.
Average hours worked per worker contributed nega-
tively by roughly 0.5 % annually over the period. In the
USA, on the other hand, the per capita growth was exclu-
sively driven by strong labour productivity increases of
2.6 % annually, while labour’s contribution was nega-
tive as regards both the employment rate (0.5 %) and
average hours worked (0.8 %).
61. The encouraging development in terms of labour
input in recent years has not been matched by a more
robust performance as regards hourly productivity
growth. The euro area has thus been unable to make
simultaneous progress on both fronts — boosting
employment and increasing labour productivity growth.
Some economists have argued that labour-market
reforms to encourage lower-skilled workers to take up
jobs may have depressed labour productivity. It seems
likely, however, that this effect has been limited and
temporary.
3.2. Explaining the poor productivity 
performance
62. The importance of structural factors in explain-
ing the recent economic performance of the euro area
¥1∂ Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2005), ‘The eco-
nomic costs of non-Lisbon: a survey of the literature on the economic
impact of Lisbon-type reforms’, European Economy, Occasional Paper,
No 16.
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can be seen by looking at the evolution of potential
growth (Graph 3.2). At around 2 %, potential growth in
the euro area is relatively low in comparison with the
levels of the early 1990s and by current international
standards. In the first half of the 1990s, potential
growth in the euro area averaged 2.3 % before falling to
an average of 1.9 % over the last five years. In the USA,
annual potential growth has remained fairly stable over
the same time period. The gap between the euro area
and US performance may be due, in part, to demo-
graphic factors. 
63. Labour productivity growth has been on a secular
declining trend in the euro area (Graph 3.3). It is wor-
rying to see that, since the mid-1990s, actual productiv-
ity growth rates in the euro area have dropped below
those recorded in the USA. This phenomenon appears to
be due to both a decline in the growth of the capital inten-
sity of production — i.e. the amount of capital per unit of
labour — (Graph 3.4) and lower growth in total factor
productivity (TFP) in the euro area (Graph 3.5). The
decline in TFP growth, which measures, inter alia, tech-
nological progress and which is now a full percentage
point lower than in the first half of the 1990s, is particu-
larly worrying as it suggests that the euro area’s produc-
tion structure is more concentrated on sectors with low
technological progress.      
64. There are several possible explanations for the
euro area’s low productivity growth, all of which seem
to play some role. First, as mentioned above, the
progress in terms of increasing overall employment
might have resulted in a temporary slowdown of pro-
ductivity growth. Empirical evidence nevertheless
indicates that the proportion of the slowdown in EU
productivity that can be attributed to employment gains
is rather low (1).
65.  Other explanations for the euro area’s low pro-
ductivity growth relate to the euro area’s industrial
structure. In particular, there is a concern that the euro
area, with its traditional comparative advantage of
medium–high-value-added industries, such as chemicals
and the automobile industry, has not yet fully grasped
the productivity gains experienced in cutting-edge tech-
nological sectors.  
Graph 3.1 Average annual real growth rates, 1999–2005 (1)
(1) Data for 2005 are based on Commission estimates.
(2) Employment measures the impact of changes in the employment rate on GDP per capita.
Source: Commission services.
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An exception here is the communications sector, where
European countries have secured a leading position.
More generally, the euro area has been characterised by
a lower productivity performance and size of ICT-pro-
ducing industries (including office equipment and semi-
conductors) and a lower productivity performance in
ICT-using services (such as wholesale and retail trade
and financial services) both sectors in which the USA
has been a very strong performer.
The lower share of highly innovative sectors and busi-
nesses also underlines the challenges for most euro area
Member States of producing and absorbing new, more
knowledge-based technologies. 
Graph 3.2 Potential GDP growth
Source: Commission services.
Graph 3.3 Trend growth in hourly labour productivity
Source: Commission services.
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3.3. Labour market developments
66.  Against the background of the pick-up in eco-
nomic activity in the euro area, positive labour-market
trends continued in 2005. This is most visible in both
the creation of more than 1 million new jobs in 2005, and
a decline of the rate of unemployment to 8.3 % in
December 2005 from 8.8 % a year earlier (1). It means
that, while the improvement in labour-market perform-
Graph 3.4 Growth of the capital intensity of production
Source: Commission services.
Graph 3.5 Growth of total factor productivity
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ Note that there is currently a significant discrepancy in the employment
data from the national accounts on the one hand and the labour force sur-
vey on the other hand. The former points to an increase of 1 million jobs in
2005, the latter records more than 2 million new people employed in 2005.
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ance was consolidated in 2005, the pace of improvement
remained gradual, having been driven by rather than
driving the pace of economic activity. The small acceler-
ation in job creation and the already significant reduction
of unemployment witnessed in 2005 indeed reflect a
number of positive as well as negative factors, which in
the end sum up to a rising employment rate but still sub-
stantial underutilisation of the euro area’s employment
potential.
67.  The 2005 labour-market performance so far defies
the predictions of jobless growth. As employment growth
in the euro area has been positive throughout the period of
economic slowdown (2001–03), some feared that the
labour hoarding in the downturn would translate into
below-par job creation during the next economic rebound.
Though sluggish economic growth has restrained the pace
of job creation, the fact that employment growth during the
economic recovery has kept pace with real GDP growth is
a positive development. It even appears that the shift
toward a higher job-intensity of growth, which has taken
place since the mid-1990s, is continuing. Since then, more
employment has been created for a given rate of economic
growth than in previous decades.
68. The average number of hours worked appears to
have declined slightly in 2005 after a marginal pick-up
in 2004. This means a continuation of the trend decline
in hourly labour utilisation, which was assumed to have
reverted or at least stopped in recent years. The reason
for the further decline is to be seen in an increasing share
of people in part-time employment rather than a fall in
the average number of hours usually worked in main
jobs in either full-time or part-time employment. The
share of part-time workers in total employment rose
from 17.5 % in 2004 to 18.6 % in 2005. In the same
period, the average number of hours usually worked
increased to 41.6 from 41.4 hours per week for those in
full-time employment and remained constant at
19.5 hours per week in part-time employment.
69. For more than 10 years, euro area employment
has benefited from an increase in labour-force partici-
pation. While the increase in participation decelerated
during the recent economic downturn and — according
to the latest data — even decelerated further in 2005, it
remained positive, which contrasts with the experience
of previous downturns and of the USA during the recent
downturn. However, it should be noted that participation
and employment rates in the euro area are still low in an
international context. The euro area employment rate
was 62.7 % in 2004, which compares to rates above
70 % in the USA, the UK, the Netherlands and all Scan-
dinavian countries. It is estimated to have improved by
0.7 percentage points to 63.4 % in 2005. Unless there is
acceleration in the pace of labour-market reforms, the
Lisbon target of achieving a participation rate of 70 %
would only be reached by 2035.
Graph 3.6 Rate of unemployment, euro area
Source: Commission services.
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70. The trend increase in labour-force participation
is linked, in part, to the higher number of women enter-
ing the labour market. Women’s higher level of educa-
tional achievement compared with previous generations
has strongly contributed to this trend. Changing financial
incentives due to both old-age pension reforms and a
reversal in the use of early retirement schemes also
appear to have played a role. Compared to these factors,
the demographic effect has been marginal but it is
expected to play a more important role in future years.
71.  Employment growth in the euro area has been
supported by a remarkable degree of wage moderation.
Neither the economic recovery nor the increase in
Graph 3.7 Real GDP and employment growth, euro area
Source: Commission services.
Graph 3.8 Change in employment and participation rates, EUR-12 and USA
Source: Commission services.
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energy prices have so far led to a visible upsurge in wage
growth. The growth of compensation per employee
decelerated to 2.0 % in 2005 from an already low 2.2 %
in 2004. Labour-cost growth in industry as well as manu-
facturing continued its downward trend in 2005. A major
determinant of continuous wage moderation has been the
behaviour of social partners in collective wage bargain-
ing. Negotiated wages are estimated to have increased by
just 2.1 % in 2005, identical to the rate of change a year
earlier. Further important factors have been the strong
pressure on profit margins from global competition and
the increase in labour-force participation, which are both
likely to have contributed to downward pressure on
wages. Continued wage moderation seems necessary in
order to help to reduce the euro area unemployment rate
substantially below the 8.4 % expected for this year. 
3.4. Further product market reforms 
essential 
72.  In recent years, euro area members have stepped
up the pace of structural reform relative to other OECD
countries. An indication of this trend can be seen in the
reduction in the stringency of regulation in selected non-
manufacturing sectors during the period 1975–2003
(Graph 3.10). Between 1995 and 2003, euro area mem-
bers cut back considerably on regulations in these sec-
tors. This contrasts with the experience of the United
States and the United Kingdom, which exhibited higher
reform intensity in the periods 1975–85 and 1985–95
respectively. Over the period 1975–2003, the intensity of
reforms in the Netherlands and Germany was actually
higher than in the United States, with countries such as
Belgium, Spain and Finland lagging not far behind.   
73. In spite of this progress, euro area members con-
tinue to lag behind countries such as the United King-
dom and the United States when it comes to the overall
Table 3.1
Decomposition of the change in the employment rate, 
EUR-12
1999–2004 2004–05
Change in employment rate, p.a. 0.49 0.71
Due to shifts in employment rate of:
— Young 0.02 0.01
— Prime age 0.27 0.32
— Older 0.16 0.33
— Male 0.07 0.17
— Female 0.40 0.49
Due to demographic effect: – 0.01 0.04
Due to interaction effect: 0.01 0.01
Source: Commission services.
Graph 3.9 Actual and negotiated wages, EU-12
Sources: Commission services and ECB.
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level of product-market regulation. Even though more
regulated countries, such as Greece, Italy and Spain,
have made significant advances in freeing up their econ-
omies from unnecessary regulatory burdens, less regu-
lated countries, such as the USA, the UK and Denmark,
have also reduced their overall levels of regulation in
product markets. Therefore, the relative positions across
countries have not changed significantly. 
74. The decline in regulatory barriers in OECD
countries has been driven by a reduction in govern-
ment intervention and the elimination of barriers to
trade and investment. A reduction in price controls and
other restrictions on business has played a key role, as
have lower tariffs and reduced restrictions on foreign
investment. Progress has been less dramatic in reducing
barriers to entrepreneurship, including, in particular,
administrative burdens and legal barriers to entry in shel-
tered markets. The need for greater competition in the
services sector is a key challenge, given that services
now account for around 70 % of total jobs and value
added in the euro area economy. 
Reinforcing the internal market
75.  An example of the payoff from greater openness
in product markets can be seen in utility markets. The
partial progress so far towards liberalisation in gas, elec-
tricity and water utilities has already contributed towards
an impressive increase in labour productivity in these
sectors. This contrasts with the experience of the USA,
where, in the absence of comparable reforms, these pro-
ductivity gains have not been matched.
76. Nevertheless, the poor performance of many euro
area Member States in transposing and applying inter-
nal market legislation remains a source of concern. For
example, only three euro area countries currently meet
the 1.5 % implementation deficit target. To increase the
responsiveness of the euro area to economic shocks and
to raise growth potential, further reforms in sectors such
as services or network industries will be essential. Due to
excessive regulatory barriers, many services and profes-
sions are sheltered both from domestic and foreign com-
petition. In network industries, progressive liberalisation
Graph 3.10 Product market reform intensity in selected sectors, 1975–2003 (% change in the indicator)
NB: The product market indicator of regulation is measured as a simple average of regulation in 7 non-manufacturing sectors: rail, road, airlines, gas, elec-
tricity, telecom and post. The indicators are normalised, ranging from 0 to 1, expressed as a percentage of the maximum score across OECD countries,
where 1 reﬂects a relatively regulated product market.
Source: OECD.
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Table 3.2
Evolution of labour productivity per hour worked in 
gas, electricity and water utilities (change per year)
1979–90 1990–95 1995–2001
EU-15 2.7 % 3.6 % 5.7 %
USA 1.1 % 1.8 % 0.1 %
Source: Commission services.
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has not always gone far enough from the point of view of
opening markets effectively to new entrants. In both
cases, productivity growth has been poor and the capac-
ity to adjust to economic shocks has been limited.
77. It is a matter of concern that only a few Member
States addressed these issues in their national reform
programmes. A positive example is Ireland which has
strengthened its internal procedures for monitoring the
implementation of Community directives. In order to
avoid complicating legislation, several Member States
actively discourage adding on further provisions when
implementing Community directives (Austria, the Neth-
erlands). In order to avoid late implementation, some
Member States have put in place fast-track procedures
(Italy, France). 
78. A further danger to the effective functioning of
the internal market lies in measures which could shield
domestic companies/sectors from competition. Protec-
tionism of any kind tends to negatively affect the com-
petitiveness of the economy in the medium and long
term. In this respect, measures impinging on the func-
tioning of the internal market would go against the
objectives of boosting efficiency through the optimal
allocation of resources and exploiting the growth poten-
tial of the European economy to the fullest extent.
Creating a business-friendly environment
79. On a positive note, euro area Member States
acknowledge the need for a better business environ-
ment for companies and, in particular, for SMEs. In
their national reform programmes, better regulation
including easier market entry (e.g. one-stop-shops) and
exit (e.g. changes in bankruptcy legislation), and reduc-
tions in administrative burdens are considered as major
tools in this respect. Moreover, some euro area countries
aim at improving the efficiency of public administra-
tions, reforming their corporate tax systems, improving
access of SMEs to financing, support for business start-
ups, diffusion of ICT and upgrading infrastructure.
These measures, together with those foreseen in the area
of labour markets, are likely to lead to some reduction in
costs for business and to contribute positively to eco-
nomic dynamism.
Promoting innovation and investing in R & D
80. In order to generate sustainable improvements in
productivity growth it is, first and foremost, necessary
to boost the euro area’s capacity to generate and, above
all, absorb and exploit knowledge. Favourable frame-
work conditions for companies to innovate are essential
in this respect. Businesses need to enjoy a friendly regu-
latory framework, have sufficient supply of highly-
qualified personnel and to have access to affordable
sources of financing. In addition, more resources need to
be invested in R & D and innovation and, in particular,
Europe-wide economies of scale should be exploited by
encouraging projects and activities with significant
cross-border spillovers. An adequate supply of highly
skilled labour is also essential for the euro area to be able
to improve its growth and productivity performance. It is
also a key policy instrument in tackling high structural
unemployment, especially among the young. 
81. In terms of innovation performance, the euro
area is lagging significantly behind top performers,
such as the USA and Japan. This is true when innova-
tion is measured by inputs (e.g. R & D intensity) or by
outputs (e.g. patent intensities). This overall picture,
nevertheless, masks a significant variation among euro
area Member States. According to the Commission’s
innovation scoreboard for 2005, only Finland and Ger-
many are in the group of ‘leading countries’, with a
majority of the euro area countries classified as average
performers. Within the euro area, the weakest perform-
ers are Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, although Por-
tugal and Greece show some signs of catching up. 
82. As regards R & D spending, there is considerable
scope for improvement. Total R & D spending in the
euro area has been stagnating slightly below 2 % since
the launch of the Lisbon strategy and continues to be sig-
nificantly below the levels in the USA (3.0 %) and Japan
(3.2 %). Nevertheless, there are considerable differences
among euro area countries, with Finland spending 3.5 %
of GDP on R & D while Portugal spends only 0.8 %. No
significant improvement has been made thus far in the
reallocation of public resources towards productivity-
increasing categories such as R & D. All euro area Mem-
ber States have nevertheless set targets with respect to
rising R & D expenditures in their national reform pro-
grammes. A further issue which requires full attention,
as reflected in national reform programmes of many euro
area Member States, is to ensure that public money is
spent effectively. In particular, scientific and innovative
excellence should be one of the key criteria for allocating
resources.
83. The promotion of private R & D and innovation
is a major challenge for the euro area. The share of
A n n u a l  r e p o r t  o n  t h e  e u r o  a r e a  —  2 0 0 6
36
business R & D spending is around 56 %, compared to
the target share of two thirds. For this purpose, a number
of Member States introduced financial incentives to pro-
mote private R & D expenditures, such as tax credits or
vouchers. Nonetheless, significant improvements in the
overall conditions for innovation should be seen as a
major tool in this respect. Some euro area Member States
are implementing measures to reinforce the link between
science and industry and to generate synergies between
public and private efforts in R & D. Some Member
States are also committed to identifying and supporting
clusters and innovation poles.
3.5. Stepping up the pace of labour-market 
reforms
84.  Many labour-market reforms have been con-
ducted by Member States in recent years. Although
these reforms have mainly been directed at addressing
country-specific challenges, they share some common
features and have a direct bearing on the euro area.
For example, this includes measures that aim at
increasing both domestic labour utilisation and
domestic labour productivity, which in turn are likely
to raise potential GDP. Higher potential GDP growth
can be expected to have positive consequences for the
resilience of the euro area economy to shocks. The
same effect can be expected from reforms that target
a better matching of labour demand and supply and at
improving the adaptability of the workforce. Equally,
measures to ensure that wages better reflect differ-
ences in productivity across sectors and regions as
well as changes in local unemployment would have a
positive impact on wage adjustment and inflation dif-
ferences in the euro area. 
Improving labour-market participation
85.  Many Member States have taken measures to
improve labour-market participation. The most promis-
ing policies have relied on a sharpening of financial
incentives to take up work through reforms of the tax and
benefit system. An example is the restructuring of
income support for the long-term unemployed in Ger-
many, which creates stronger incentives for long-term
unemployed to accept low-paid work and for short-term
unemployed to avoid long-term unemployment. The
Netherlands undertook a major reform of the unemploy-
ment insurance system, which involved a sharp reduc-
tion of the maximum period of benefit entitlement, a
severe reduction of the level of benefits and a tightening
of the employment-history requirement for benefit eligi-
bility. Another example was the introduction and exten-
sion, respectively, of tax credits for low-income earners
in Greece, Finland and the Netherlands.
86. There are important signs that such reforms are
beginning to improve incentives to take up work. For
example, the tax wedge on labour costs for low-wage
earners, measuring the relative tax burden for an
employed person, has continuously fallen in recent
years, from a level of 43.4 % in 1996 to 39.0 % in 2004
for the euro area as a whole. Moreover, the unemploy-
ment trap, measuring the percentage of gross earning
which is taxed away through higher tax and social-secu-
rity contributions and the withdrawal of unemployment
benefits when an unemployed person returns to work,
has fallen slightly over the 2001–04 period. The same
holds for the ‘low wage trap’ for a single person without
children — i.e. the percentage of the gross earnings that
is ‘taxed away’ by the combined effects of higher taxes
and reduced or lost benefits, when an employed single
person moves from 33 % to 67 % of the average earnings
of a production worker. 
87. In many Member States, reforms have focused on
those parts of the population where labour-market par-
ticipation is low or unemployment is high. These are
predominantly young people, women and older people.
The benefits of reforms to tighten the eligibility criteria
for early retirement are beginning to materialise, with the
participation rate of older workers increasing considera-
bly in recent years (See Graph 3.11). In their national
reform programmes, some Member States also foresee
targeted measures for other groups with low labour-mar-
ket attachment such as ethnic minorities (Netherlands),
immigrants (Ireland), disabled people (Netherlands,
Austria) and domestic residents (Luxembourg). Since
reservation rates — which measure the ratio between
income received when unemployed and net income
when employed — have been high in many Member
States, reforms in this area and especially cuts in non-
wage labour costs appear to be appropriate measures for
the countries concerned.
Improving the match between labour demand 
and supply
88. Initiatives that aim to improve job placement have
been widespread across Member States. For example,
Germany, France and Italy reformed their public
employment services, giving more scope for the involve-
ment of private providers. Reforms of public employ-
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ment services have either been adopted or are foreseen in
the national reform programmes of Belgium, Greece,
Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal. Often they are
accompanied by a shift from passive to active labour-
market policies. These reforms will be particularly valu-
able for tackling the different problems in the matching
of labour demand and labour supply which exist in euro
area countries. 
Reforms to education and training systems 
89.  Linked to the objective of enhancing the produc-
tivity of labour, many euro area Member States gave a
prominent place to reforming training and education
systems. Efforts have generally focused on improving
the human capital of young people through reforms of
school systems, for instance with the objective of reduc-
ing the number of early school leavers, improving voca-
tional training and facilitating entrance to the labour
market. The impact of these policies on labour produc-
tivity is likely to accrue gradually, as young people take
up employment. In France, a new law adopted in 2005,
and to be implemented in 2006, aims to improve the
quality of and access to lifelong education and training,
including the creation of a ‘core knowledge and skills’
curriculum for all students. In 2005, Italy increased the
number of years of guaranteed state education and train-
ing for everybody to 12 years. In Finland, specific meas-
ures were adopted that aim at boosting on-the-job train-
ing in 2004 while Germany initiated a modernisation of
the vocational training system. 
90.  According to their national reform programmes,
workplace programmes are envisaged to play a role in
Ireland and Finland. Measures concerning adult train-
ing and life-long learning could contribute to both
greater productivity and the adaptability of the current
labour force, but they featured less prominently in
national reform programmes and it is difficult to say
whether the effects will show up in aggregate productiv-
ity figures.
Improving the adaptability of the workforce 
91.  Reforms to boost the responsiveness of the
labour market to economic shocks, which are critical
for a dynamic and smooth functioning EMU, have
been enacted mainly in indirect terms. For example,
reforms that aim at increasing labour utilisation and
human capital will also improve the adaptability and the
flexibility of the workforce. Moreover, measures that
focus on the matching of labour demand and supply, for
example through an upgrading of public-employment
services, can be expected to improve adjustment to
shocks. The few measures adopted in the field of
employment protection have targeted flexibility of work
contracts for new entrants and disadvantaged people
through fixed-term contracts, job agencies and public
employment schemes, while leaving unchanged the leg-
Graph 3.11 Change in the employment rate of older workers, 1999–2004
Source: Commission services.
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islation on permanent employment that may act as a bar-
rier to labour-market adjustment. 
92.  In the area of working-time organisation, there
are several positive examples of reforms. These include
measures aimed at improving the access to sabbatical
leave schemes (in particular the life-course savings
scheme introduced in the Netherlands) or extending par-
ents’ rights — for instance in the form of longer career
breaks or flexible working for family reasons (Belgium,
Ireland) — while at the same time introducing more flex-
ible work-time arrangements to adjust employees’ work-
ing hours to the changing needs for labour. This con-
cerned, in particular, the regulation of overtime work
(for instance in Greece and France) and the introduction/
extension of working-time account schemes (such as in
Germany and Greece). 
93.  Legislation on permanent employment has been
left unchanged in spite of labour-market reforms in,
for example, Italy, France and Germany. In Italy,
measures enacted in 2004 were limited to setting the
conditions for the implementation of new types of flexi-
ble contracts whereas a draft law proposing a marginal
loosening of employment protection has not been pur-
sued. France introduced a degree of flexibility in the pro-
cedure to be followed in the case of collective dismissals
(Fillon law) but plans for a new type of employment con-
tract for entrants to the labour market (Contrat première
embauche) were withdrawn earlier this year. In Ger-
many, the agreement on a prolongation of the probation
period for new entrants has not yet been translated into
law.
Reforms to wage-setting systems
94.  Modest reform efforts have been devoted to the
issues of wage developments, wage flexibility and wage
differentiation. Indeed, wage issues play a significant
role in only a few national reform programmes, most
notably in Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. Min-
imum-wage settings were at the centre of actual policy
action in many countries, including France, Luxembourg
and Spain. In Germany, a debate on the usefulness of
national minimum wages has been launched. Despite lit-
tle activity by public authorities in reforming wage-bar-
gaining systems and a general stability of bargaining
institutions, it can be noted that social partners in some
countries, for example Germany, Italy, the Netherlands
or Finland, have embedded elements in collective wage
contracts that allow for more flexibility. This has been
done either through the introduction of opt-out clauses
that allow firms to deviate from collectively agreed con-
tracts or by widening the possibility for additional agree-
ments at the company level within more centralised
wage-bargaining systems. These measures contributed
to wage moderation, but had little impact on wage differ-
entiation. Therefore, it appears premature to expect any
significant changes to the responsiveness of wages to
economic developments in the euro area. 
Investing in human capital
95.  In order to improve the supply of highly-skilled
labour, an upgrading of education and training sys-
tems in many Member States is necessary. Efforts
should concentrate on building human capital, develop-
ing comprehensive and coherent lifelong learning strate-
gies and raising the quality of education and training.
Improvements in school systems are necessary, espe-
cially to reduce the numbers of early school leavers, to
raise upper secondary completion rates and to improve
reading literacy rates. The quality, relevance and attrac-
tiveness of vocational training need to be enhanced.
Reforms should further the development of open and
flexible pathways, allowing individuals to update their
skills when required throughout their working lives.
96. While reforming primary and secondary educa-
tion systems is important, a stronger emphasis in the
euro area should be placed on pre-primary education.
Research shows that, whatever a country’s level of
development, economic as well as social returns to
investment are highest from educational interventions at
an early age. Benefits include higher levels of education
attainment and of participation in lifelong learning,
resulting in improved economic competitiveness as well
as reduced welfare spending.
97. The quality of tertiary education needs to be
improved in several Member States. This is essential in
order to seek excellence through better links between
research, innovation and business and to increase the
contribution of universities to social cohesion and eco-
nomic growth. In this respect, some euro area Member
States have already made some (limited) progress. The
impact of these steps on labour productivity is likely to
accrue gradually as young people enter into employ-
ment.
98. New measures in the area of training for adults
that could contribute to both greater productivity and
adaptability of the current labour force are important
to increase human capital. However, the progress with
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respect to lifelong learning has been slow and these
measures feature less prominently in the reform plans of
Member States. Few Member States are currently reach-
ing the target of 12.5 % set for participation in life-long
learning.
3.6. The economic implications 
of growth differences
99.  The persistence of cross-country growth differ-
ences in the euro area underlines the added importance
of structural reforms for euro area Member States.
During the period 1999–2005, the difference between
the fastest and slowest growing Member States in the
euro area averaged 5.7 %, with the gap widening slightly
during the recovery from the 2001 slowdown. In 2005,
this figure stood at 4â percentage points. 
100. Growth differences can occur in large monetary
unions for a variety of reasons. They may be the result
of temporary country-specific factors, such as differ-
ences in weather, consumer preferences, cyclical posi-
tions and the timing of national economic policy deci-
sions. They may also reflect longer-term factors, such
as demographic developments and the evolution of
employment levels, investment patterns and total factor
productivity. Some growth differences are desirable: for
example, differences in growth rates may be welcome to
the extent that they result from an increase in the per cap-
ita income levels of catching-up countries.
101. Recent growth differences in the euro area are
not unusually large by historical standards. Annual
GDP growth data confirm that the dispersion within the
euro area is not higher than in previous cycles (Graph
3.12). Since the mid-1990s, annual growth rates across
Member States in the euro area have actually become
more similar. Dispersion was not constant, however, and
increased notably in 1996/97 when an economic recov-
ery started. This was followed by a period of increased
growth-rate convergence which lasted until 2000. In
2003, divergence peaked again (as another economic
recovery started). Since 2004, growth rates in the various
euro area countries have again become more similar. 
102. Compared with other large monetary unions,
euro area growth differences are also not unusually
large. Graph 3.13 shows that growth dispersion —
which is measured as the average percentage deviation
from the statistical mean of a currency area — within the
United States is clearly as large as those in the euro area.
Similarly, intra-German growth differences have histori-
cally been as high as the dispersion across the euro area
Graph 3.12 Dispersion in annual growth in the euro area (standard deviation in %, 1980–2005)
NB: EUR-12: all euro Members States; EUR-10: all euro Members States excluding IE and LU; EUR-4: DE, FR, IT and ES.
Source: Commission Services.
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Member States. These comparisons should, however,
not be over-interpreted: higher factor mobility, financial
integration and fiscal transfers make it, in principle, eas-
ier to deal with growth dispersion within those countries
than among euro area members.
103. The dispersion of growth differences in the euro
area has persisted in spite of a better synchronisation of
Member States’ business cycles. In fact, since the early
1990s, the economies of the euro area have become more
closely aligned in cyclical terms. As can be seen in
Graphs 3.14 and 3.15, the movement of output gaps —
which measures the difference between actual and
potential output — has become more similar across euro
area countries in recent years.     
104. Greater cyclical convergence in the euro area
may be due to the positive impact of increased trade-
ties, greater financial-market integration and better
macroeconomic management. It may also be partly
attributed to increasing globalisation and the predomi-
nance of global shocks in explaining cyclical develop-
ments in the past few years. By itself, this is good news
for EMU as monetary unions work best when their mem-
bers enjoy a high degree of cyclical synchronisation.  
105. The decreasing importance of cyclical factors
means that structural factors now account for a high
share of the growth differences that remain. This is
reflected in Graph 3.16, which shows that potential
growth rates of euro area Member States vary consider-
ably. The persistence of growth differences in the euro
area — to the extent that they are not explained by demo-
graphics or catching up — is a source of concern as it
implies that the difference between fast- and slow-grow-
ing Member States in the euro could become entrenched
over time (Graph 3.17). 
106. Growth differences in the euro area reflect a vari-
ety of factors. For example, it appears that economic
shocks, such as swings in exchange rates, equity and oil
prices, as well as large fluctuations in the global
economy, have affected Member States differently due
to variations in economic structures and policy
responses. Budgetary policies may also have fuelled
cyclical differences in the euro area. In particular, insuf-
ficient fiscal consolidation in a number of Member
States during the good times of the late 1990s may have
contributed to overheating as well as hindering the free
play of automatic stabilisers during the recent downturn.
From a longer-term perspective, cross-country differ-
ences in the growth of employment and, to a lesser
extent, total factor productivity, have also played a role.
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that growth
differences cannot be fully explained by catching up in
poorer Member States. 
Graph 3.13 Differences in growth dispersion (1) (euro area, Germany, USA) (in %, 1992–2005)
(1) Euro 12: all euro Member States 4; Euro 4: DE, FR, IT, ES; Germany: 16 Bundesländer, USA: 50 States.
Source: Commission services.
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107. A major characteristic of persistent growth dif-
ferences within the euro area is that price and cost
competitiveness have tended to adjust too slowly in
some Member States. Graph 3.18 displays a widely
used indicator of price and cost competitiveness —
the real effective exchange rate. Competitiveness is
measured against other euro area Member States and
calculated on the basis of unit labour costs. While
Graph 3.14 Output gaps in the five largest euro area countries (as % of GDP)
(quarterly data, 1996Q1-2006Q1)
Source: Commission services.
Graph 3.15 Output gaps in the six smaller euro area countries (as % of GDP)
(quarterly data, 1996Q1-2006Q1)
Source: Commission services.
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fluctuations in intra-euro area competitiveness are to
be expected in the short term, the persistent deteriora-
tion of competitiveness in some slow-growing Mem-
ber States suggests a failure to adjust to economic
shocks.
3.7. The economic implications of inflation 
differences
108.  Cross-country inflation differences in the euro
area have also shown a high degree of persistence. Since
1999, some Member States have consistently recorded
Graph 3.16 Potential growth rates, 2005 (annual % change)
Source: Commission services.
Graph 3.17 Gross domestic product at 1995 market price (1) (national currency, annual % change)
(1) MIN denotes the slowest growth in the Euro area for a giver year and MAX denotes the highest. The MIN and MA Member States are indicated next to
the relevant. 
Source: Commission services.
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price rises above or below the euro area average. In 2006,
the difference between the highest and lowest rates of
inflation in the euro area stood at 2.7 percentage points. 
109.  Inflation differences are also a normal feature
of large monetary unions. In the short term, inflation
differences could reflect real exchange-rate adjustments in
a monetary union, where by definition the nominal
exchange rate between members is fixed. Temporary dif-
ferences in inflation rates may be tolerable if they reflect
productivity gains in the traded sector or if they help the
economy to return to equilibrium following an economic
disturbance. However, long-term inflation differences can
lead to prolonged periods of overheating and overcooling,
fuelling economic imbalances within the euro area. More-
over, persistent inflation differentials complicate the task
of the ECB in deciding on the appropriate stance of mon-
etary policy for the euro area aggregate.
110.  The 1990s saw a remarkable degree of conver-
gence in consumer price inflation among euro area
Member States. The spread between the Member States
with the highest and lowest (monthly) headline inflation
rates fell from close to 20 percentage points in the early
1990s to spreads of less than 2 percentage points in the
period 1997–99 (Graph 3.19, right hand scale). The
unweighted standard deviation, another measure of dis-
persion which is less affected by outliers, followed a
similar path, falling from over 5 percentage points in the
early 1990s to historical lows of less than 1 percentage
point in 1999, the year the euro came into being, and
again in 2004 (Graph 3.19, left hand scale).  
111. The level of inflation dispersion has remained
broadly stable at those low levels since 1999. This
remarkable degree of inflation convergence was
achieved in the context of a generalised period of disin-
flation in the world economy. Moreover, disinflation in
Member States partly reflected the need to fulfil the
Treaty’s convergence criteria for participation in EMU.
By way of comparison, data for 14 US metropolitan sta-
tistical areas (MSAs) show that inflation dispersion in
the USA, measured by the unweighted standard devia-
tion, has been fairly stable and mostly below 1 percent-
age point since 1994 (Graph 3.20) The comparison
shows that the high degree of inflation convergence
achieved by Member States in the run-up to stage 3 of
EMU has brought inflation dispersion in the euro area to
a similar level as that prevailing in the USA.  
112. There are many possible causes of inflation dif-
ferences in the euro area. Three appear to be particu-
larly salient.  
• Firstly, differences in productivity gains between
the tradable and the non-tradable sectors — the so-
called Balassa-Samuelson effect — may have con-
tributed to inflationary pressures across euro area
Graph 3.18 Developments in intra-area competitiveness (REER based on unit labour costs (1) — index)
(1) Real effective exchange rate against 11 other Member States.
Source: Commission services.
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Member States. In particular, empirical studies sug-
gest a negative link between income levels and price
increases, implying that inflationary pressures were
greater in catching-up economies. However, the
correlation between income and inflation disparities
over the 12 euro area Member States is low, indicat-
ing that the Balassa-Samuelson effect was not the
only source of price dispersion in the recent past. 
Graph 3.19 Inflation dispersion in the euro area (in % points)
(1) Unweighted.
Source: Commission services.
Graph 3.20 Inflation dispersion in the euro area and the USA (unweighted standard 
deviation of annual % changes)
Sources: Commission services calculation and Bureau of Labour Statistics.
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• Secondly, growth and inflation differences in the
euro area appear, in some respects, to have been
intertwined. Although Member States’ business
cycles have become more closely aligned in recent
years, the cyclical differences that do remain have
contributed to different inflation pressures across
the euro area. In particular, inflation has tended to be
higher in the euro area’s fastest-growing Member
States. 
• Thirdly, since its very beginning, the euro area has
experienced a series of price shocks, including large
swings in energy prices and prices for unprocessed
food. Due to differences in Member States’ con-
sumption patterns and in their exposure to extra-
euro-area trade, these shocks have led to divergence
in inflation rates. Energy, for example, contributed
to as much as 23 % to euro area inflation dispersion
in 2005 and the first quarter of 2006. 
113. These developments should, however, not disguise
the fact that it is the so-called core inflation sectors that
account for 80 % of euro area inflation dispersion over the
period 1999–2005. A look at these sectors (which include
services, processed food and non-energy industrial goods)
at the Member-State level is especially instructive.
114. Some Member States have registered persistent
inflation differentials relative to the euro area average
in the sectors that make up core inflation. Given their
significant weight in the overall HICP index, these dif-
ferences can easily translate into lasting overall inflation
differentials. The persistence of such differentials could
indicate that structural rigidities are the root cause of
these developments and may have hindered competitive-
ness adjustment in some euro area countries.
3.8. Policy responses to growth 
and inflation differences 
115. Although growth and inflation differences within
the euro area are not unusually large, their persistence
warrants close attention. This is, above all, essential to
allow EMU to function smoothly and to prevent the gap
between fast- and slow-growing Member States from
becoming entrenched over time. 
116. In the macroeconomic domain, budgetary policy
holds the key. The comparatively large size of the gov-
ernment sector in the euro area, the progressiveness of
the tax system and the generosity of unemployment ben-
efit mean that automatic stabilisers can play an important
role in cushioning the initial impact of economic shocks
that have country-specific effects. To be able to benefit
from the full working of automatic stabilisers, Member
States should run prudent policies, in particular in good
times. This means that, in the majority of cases, achiev-
Graph 3.21 Differentials in core inflation in relation to euro area average (annual averages, % points)
Source: Commission services.
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ing and sustaining budgetary positions of close to bal-
ance or in surplus over the medium term should be the
highest priority. 
117. Budgetary policy can also make an important
contribution in Member States with low potential
growth by promoting a more efficient allocation of
resources. This can be achieved by redirecting expendi-
ture towards growth-enhancing categories and ensuring
that tax structures and their interaction with benefit sys-
tems promote higher growth potential through more
employment and investment. A question for further dis-
cussion concerns whether, and under which circum-
stances, additional fiscal action may be required under
EMU, particularly in the context of overheating or over-
cooling. In particular for the latter case, creating further
margins in good times seems to be an important require-
ment. At the present juncture, this underlines the need
for euro area Member States to seize the opportunity cre-
ated by the economic recovery to undertake necessary
budgetary consolidation.
118. Getting to grips with growth and inflation differ-
ences also requires structural reforms to increase the
responsiveness of prices and wages to changing eco-
nomic circumstances. In this context, particular atten-
tion has to be paid to reforms that enhance the respon-
siveness of real wages to economic developments and
foster a sufficient degree of competition in product mar-
kets. Reforms to remove formal and informal mecha-
nisms of wage indexation and to promote greater differ-
entiation in minimum wage legislation could also help to
reduce growth differences in the euro area. 
119. To ensure a strong link between wage flexibility
and adjustment via the competitiveness channel, there
must be a sufficient degree of competition in the market
for goods and services. Recent studies suggest that strin-
gent product-market regulation is likely to slow an
economy’s return to potential growth after a negative
disturbance. Evidence also reveals that profit margins in
the euro area are less responsive to changes in economic
activity than in other OECD economies, implying that
the response of euro area firms to economic shocks is
more sluggish. Further deregulation and liberalisation
would make a significant contribution to better growth
and inflation performances. 
120. A stronger effort to raise potential output is para-
mount in those Member States that perform less well
than the euro area average. In this context, structural
reform is probably the most important contribution
Member States can give to making growth converge to
high rates. While trade ties will continue to strengthen
under EMU, Member States can help to speed up this
virtuous cycle by removing the remaining barriers to
trade and fostering competition in the internal market.
3.9. The benefits of coordinated structural 
reforms
121. Euro area Member States face a shared challenge
of implementing structural reforms to ensure well-
functioning product, labour and capital markets. Struc-
tural reforms are important not only for achieving higher
growth and employment, but are also vital for ensuring
that prices and wages adjust smoothly to economic
shocks. Smooth adjustment is critical for getting to grips
with growth and inflation differences and, as argued in
Chapter 4, for contributing to an orderly adjustment to
the imbalances that have built up in the global economy.
122.  There are also economic benefits from promot-
ing a coordinated approach to structural reform in a
monetary union. In the first place, the benefits of struc-
tural reforms in one Member State will have a greater
effect on the rest of the euro area because of the
increased economic interdependence that comes from
sharing a single currency. Furthermore, opening up
product, labour and capital markets across the euro area
will allow the benefits of structural reform to accrue
more quickly, thus increasing popular support for reform
measures.
123. The need for a coordinated approach to structural
reforms in the euro area is central to the relaunched Lis-
bon strategy. In the Integrated Guidelines for growth and
jobs 2005–08, euro area countries are encouraged to press
forward with structural reforms that will increase long-
term potential growth and improve productivity, competi-
tiveness and adjustment to asymmetric shocks. To moni-
tor the implementation of these reforms, the Commis-
sion’s ‘Annual progress report on growth and jobs’
includes a separate chapter on policies to promote a
dynamic and smooth functioning EMU, recognising that
the euro area is more than just the sum of its parts. This
point was acknowledged at the spring European Council
earlier this year, when EU leaders called for enhanced
structural reforms to tackle asymmetric economic devel-
opments within the euro area. Further focus by the Euro-
group on tackling structural reform challenges will be
essential for fostering progress. 
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4. The external dimension
124. The creation of EMU has often been called the
biggest change in the international monetary and
financial system since the collapse of the Bretton-
Woods system in the early 1970s. Due to the size of the
euro area economy and thanks to its well-functioning
stability-oriented framework, the euro area now carries a
considerable weight in the global economy. Against this
backdrop, this chapter explores the emergence of the
euro as a global currency, the evolution of the euro’s
external value in recent years and the euro area’s devel-
oping role in international financial institutions and
forums. It also looks at the potential role of the euro area
in dealing with global imbalances.
4.1. The emergence of the euro as a global 
currency
125.  Since its launch in 1999, the euro has risen in
global prominence, rapidly becoming the second most
important international currency, behind the US dol-
lar.
• Today, the euro accounts for a substantial and
increasing part of the international debt markets
(31.5 % versus 44 % for the US dollar by the end
of June 2005), with European legal entities located
in the vicinity of the euro area accounting for the
largest share. 
• The euro also represents a large part of interna-
tional bank liabilities. For example, since 1999, the
euro has been the second currency of denomination
of loans by euro area banks to non-bank borrowers
outside the euro area, with the share above 39 % in
the first quarter of 2005 (against 44 % for the US
dollar).
• In foreign exchange markets, the euro is the second
most actively traded currency, with a rather stable
share. Between July 2004 and June 2005, it
accounted for 21.5 % of all foreign exchange trans-
actions versus 45 % for the US dollar.
• The euro is also used extensively to quote, invoice
and settle external trade transactions between the
euro area and third countries and, in some cases,
between third countries. In 2004, in most euro area
countries for which data are available, the share of
euro-denominated exports and imports was above
50 %, for both goods and services. 
• The euro plays a role as an anchor or reference cur-
rency, notably in acceding and accession countries,
northern Africa and the CFA franc-zone. A few
countries, mainly in central Europe and the west-
ern Balkans, are using the euro as a de facto cur-
rency, sometimes in parallel to their own national
currencies.
• Finally, the share of the euro in official foreign
exchange reserves held by central banks around the
world is gradually increasing (standing by end-
2004 at 24.9 % versus 65.9 % for the US dollar),
and significantly exceeding positions held by the
national currencies that preceded the euro.
4.2. Developments in the external value 
of the euro
126. In the first half of 2006, the euro appreciated
against the dollar and the yen, having depreciated in both
cases in 2005, but the change in nominal and real effec-
tive exchange rates has been less pronounced. Since the
beginning of 2006, the euro has gained almost 8 %
against the US dollar and some 3.5 % against the Japa-
nese yen. In nominal effective terms, the euro appreci-
ated by around 4 % (Graph 4.1). The nominal effective
exchange rate of the euro is currently some 15 % above
its 1995–2004 average (Graph 4.2). In real effective
terms, the euro exchange rate is slightly above its 1995–
2004 average.
A n n u a l  r e p o r t  o n  t h e  e u r o  a r e a  —  2 0 0 6
48
127. Market expectations about the course of monetary
policy in the USA and the euro area were the main deter-
minant of movements in the dollar–euro-segment in inter-
national foreign exchange markets in 2005. The US Fed-
eral Reserve hiked its policy rate eight times by a total of
200 basis points over the course of the year, while the
ECB only raised its key policy rates by 25 basis points in
December 2005. Moreover, markets only started to take
possible ECB hikes into account as of September 2005.
The most recent episode of euro strength has been trig-
gered by a change in interest rate expectations but it
gained momentum after the IMF spring meetings in
Washington in April which renewed financial markets’
concerns about global imbalances. 
Graph 4.1 Euro exchange rates (daily data, Jan. 1980 – June 2006)
Source: Commission services.
Graph 4.2 NEER and REER vs. rest of broad group (monthly data, double export weights, 
1995–2006 average=100)
Source: Commission services.
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128. Interest-rate differentials and global imbal-
ances will play a role in determining whether the
remainder of 2006 will see a continued appreciation
of the euro or a renewing of the 2005 dollar strength.
The interest-rate differential remains in the dollar’s
favour, as does the expected growth differential over
the short term (Graph 4.3). On the other hand, some of
the factors that supported the dollar in 2005 may not
be present to the same degree this year. Market
observers expect the Fed tightening cycle to come to
an end and some even expect a monetary-policy eas-
ing in 2007, which would slowly reduce the interest-
rate differential between the USA and the euro area.
This should also reflect a scenario of slowing growth
in the USA and further strengthening in the euro area.
Asian governments could be more inclined to allow
their currencies to strengthen now that the holdings of
foreign-exchange reserves are more than ample to
insure against future crises and as domestic demand in
the region picks up. In addition, currency appreciation
could be beneficial from the perspective of keeping
inflation rates in check. The dollar could also find
itself under downward pressure if there were to be a
re-emergence of concerns about global imbalances
(e.g. due to a sharper-than-expected deterioration in
the US current account deficit) or renewed geo-politi-
cal tensions (e.g. heightened concerns over the secu-
rity of oil supplies). 
4.3. Projecting a strong voice on the world 
stage
129. In view of the euro’s global reach, the euro area
needs to show leadership on the world stage and to con-
tribute to the stability of the global economy. This point
was recognised by EU leaders at the European Council
in Vienna in December 1998, where it was agreed that
the euro area should speak with one voice on issues of
particular relevance to EMU. In particular, it was agreed
that such views would be presented at the IMF executive
board by the relevant member of the executive director’s
office of the Member State holding the EU presidency,
assisted by a representative of the Commission. It was
also proposed that the Eurogroup president, assisted by
the European Commission, should participate in meet-
ings of the G7 finance ministers.
130. In spite of the relatively modest scope of the
Vienna European Council’s aims, insufficient
progress has been made towards their implementation
(see Table 4.1). In the IMF, the ECB was granted
observer status in 1998 for selected IMF board discus-
sions related to monetary and exchange-rate matters.
Furthermore, euro area positions are now presented by
the executive director of the Member State holding the
EU presidency or the future holders of the presidency in
cases where non-euro area countries are in the chair.
Graph 4.3 USD/EUR and expected interest rate differential (daily data, three-month forward 
rates in basis points)
Source: Commission services.
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However, the Eurogroup presidency is not normally
present at the IMF and the Commission does not play
any role at all, with plans to put a Commission official in
a European executive director office not yet coming to
fruition. In the G7, the Eurogroup president now attends
all agenda items at the G7 finance ministers meetings.
However, the Commission only attends certain parts of
the meetings and, like the Eurogroup presidency, is not
fully involved in the G7 preparatory process. The ECB
attends the whole meeting, while the relevant national
central bank governors of euro area Member States only
attend certain parts of the meeting.
131. The involvement of the euro area in other eco-
nomic and financial institutions and forums varies
considerably (Table 4.1). In the OECD, for example,
there is a high degree of involvement with the Commis-
sion participating in all meetings and the ECB and Euro-
group presidency playing a role in discussions that have
a bearing on the euro area economy. In contrast, the
Commission is not a full participant in the G20 — an
increasingly important forum for discussing issues per-
taining to the global economy — and attends only as part
of the EU presidency delegation. Similarly, the observer
status granted to the Commission on the International
Monetary and Financial Committee is not commensurate
with the Community’s central role in promoting finan-
cial market integration in Europe. The participation of
the EU presidency but not the euro area presidency in
this forum also makes it more difficult to address issues
that are especially relevant for euro area Member States. 
132. The external representation of the euro area
reveals the value-added of and the limits to informal
coordination between Member States. Euro area finance
ministers and their officials now regularly elaborate
common positions and understandings in preparation for
international meetings. These Brussels-based coordina-
tion efforts are complemented by efforts from European
representatives in the IMF who have stepped up the fre-
quency of their meetings to enhance the coordination of
positions taken in the IMF’s executive board. While such
endeavours are welcome, they tend to produce rather
weak and defensive position-taking that is not commen-
surate with the economic weight of the euro area in the
global economy. Furthermore, it has proven difficult to
adapt common positions to fast-changing discussions in
the international forums. Finally, the list of issues sub-
ject to coordination remains limited and does not cover
all the topics where the euro area is increasingly seen as
a global actor by its international partners. These limita-
tions were recognised by the European Parliament,
Table 4.1
External representation of the euro area: a selected overview
Eurogroup presidency Ecofin presidency European Central Bank European Commission
OECD Participates in Economic 
and Development Review 
Committee examination of 
the euro area
Participates in Economic 
and Development Review 
Committee, Economic 
Policy Committee, and 
Committee on Financial 
Markets
Quasi-membership
(no voting rights and does 
not contribute to OECD 
budget but participates in 
all meetings)
IMF executive board Euro area position 
represented by executive 
director holding EU/euro 
area presidency
Observer status
Financial Stability Forum Full participation
International Monetary 
and Financial Committee
Full participation 
depending on the 
constituency agreement
Observer status Observer status
G7 ﬁnance ministers Full attendance but not 
involved in preparatory 
work
Full attendance but not 
involved in preparatory 
work
Partial attendance but not 
involved in preparatory 
work
G20 Full participation Full participation Attends meetings as part 
of the Ecoﬁn presidency 
delegation
Source: Commission services.
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which, in a resolution adopted on 14 March 2006,
strongly called for a better coordination of the EU posi-
tions within the IMF (1).
133. The shortcomings in the external representation
of the euro area make it difficult for Europe to project
its voice on the world economic stage. This, in turn,
makes it harder for the euro area to fulfil its responsibil-
ities as the world’s second most important currency to
promote the shared interests of euro area Member States
in international institutions and forums. This lack of
influence on global economic issues is far from satisfac-
tory at a time when Europe is being criticised in some
quarters for being over-represented in international insti-
tutions and forums. 
4.4. Addressing the challenge of global 
imbalances
134. Projecting a stronger voice on the world stage is
made all the more important at the current juncture by
the need for the euro area to show leadership in the
face of global imbalances (see Graph 4.4). In 2005, the
United States posted the largest current account deficit in
its history. It reached 6.4 % of GDP in 2005 (USD 805
billion), up from 5.7 % in 2004 (USD 668 billion). It rep-
resents more than 1.5 % of world GDP, meaning that the
US is absorbing roughly three quarters of the net capital
outflows of all countries running current account sur-
pluses. Imbalances have also widened in major surplus
regions (Japan, emerging Asia and oil-exporting emerg-
ing economies in the Middle East) amounting to around
1.4 % of world GDP in 2004 (the last year for which data
are available). In contrast to other major global regions,
the euro area does not have a significant external imbal-
ance. This may be a sign of macroeconomic health, but
it may also partly reflect the subdued growth of domestic
demand experienced in recent years.
135. The widening of global imbalances in recent
years is due to a combination of forces that have given
rise to persistent differences in saving and investment
behaviour and consequent divergences in the strength
of domestic demand across major world regions. These
include differences in productivity growth and investor
preferences for different assets, sharp declines in US
savings, weak investment in much of Asia, and, argua-
bly, rigid exchange-rate policies in many emerging
Asian economies. Sustained higher oil prices have also
contributed to widening imbalances, due to the high oil-
content of US imports and weak investment in energy-
exporting countries, notably in the Middle East and in
Russia, that have benefited from higher oil revenues. 
136. The fact that imbalances continue to widen raises
questions about the adequacy of current policy
responses in countries with large deficits or surpluses
and the efficacy of international efforts to promote an
orderly unwinding of global imbalances. Although time
lags between the implementation of necessary measures
and their effects may play a role, the implementation of
the necessary measures has been far from sufficient. In
this context, the IMF managing director has recently pro-
posed a new framework for IMF surveillance. This new
framework, by strengthening the multilateral component
of surveillance, should make a positive contribution,
provided that all relevant players contribute to reducing
global current imbalances. 
137. While financial markets have remained broadly
sanguine about the risks posed by global imbalances,
the unprecedented size and duration of these imbal-
ances means that they cannot continue to grow indefi-
nitely. There is now a broad acceptance among policy-
makers that an orderly adjustment of imbalances must be
promoted. The key issue is how to work together to
avoid a disorderly correction that could involve undesir-
able movements in exchange rates, disruptive capital-
flow reversals and negative effects on investor confi-
dence.
138. Although the euro area has a roughly balanced
current account, it would not be immune to the effects
of a disorderly correction in global imbalances. Such an
event could affect euro area trade due to changes in
exchange rate and global demand. It would affect the
value of assets held abroad by euro area residents,
thereby moderating consumption. Business confidence
could also be severely hit, in particular in the event of a
severe output contraction in deficit regions. 
139. All major regions have a responsibility to put in
place policies that will contribute to an orderly adjust-
ment. In the United States, a key challenge is to increase
private and public savings. This could be achieved
through a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. It
would be based on a credible medium-term fiscal con-
¥1∂ European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs,
‘Report on the strategic review of the International Monetary Fund’,
1.2.2006, final A6-0022/2006.
A n n u a l  r e p o r t  o n  t h e  e u r o  a r e a  —  2 0 0 6
52
solidation programme. Measures such as broadening tax
bases, restraining discretionary expenditure and reform-
ing age-related entitlement spending could be consid-
ered, as could an adjustment of fiscal incentives to
encourage private savings. In relation to monetary
policy, the US Federal Reserve has already raised short-
term rates considerably since mid-2004. However, the
effect of higher short-term rates on the real economy has
been blunted by surprisingly low long-term interest
rates, which are nevertheless now starting to rise. Higher
interest rates, particularly long-term rates, would con-
tribute to higher national saving both directly and indi-
rectly (through their likely impact on asset price infla-
tion).
140. Economies with large external surpluses, includ-
ing those in Asia, could also contribute to the adjust-
ment by shifting from export-led to domestically-gener-
ated growth. As domestic demand accelerates in these
countries, their savings (and current account) surpluses
will be reduced. Some emerging Asian economies have
already experienced faster growth of domestic demand,
and there are encouraging signs from the continued
revival in Japan. China is somewhat exceptional for
Asia, in that it has experienced strong investment growth
but weak consumption growth. There are a number of
measures that Asian economies could take to stimulate
consumption, and, outside of China, investment. These
include developing financial infrastructure to make it
easier for households and small and medium-sized enter-
prises to obtain credit, and raising levels of social protec-
tion in order to reduce the need for precautionary saving. 
141. Furthermore, properly aligned currencies will
be instrumental in encouraging investment in the
non-tradable sector and growth of domestic demand
more generally. There is, therefore, a case for econo-
mies in the Asian region to allow their currencies to
appreciate more. Exchange-rate flexibility, while not
directly addressing the underlying cause of the imbal-
ances, would help to provide a more flexible environ-
ment for imbalances to be resolved. It would also
reduce the need for Asian economies to continue to
build up large foreign exchange reserves, which is
costly and potentially risky. 
142. The euro area itself, with its balanced current
account, is not part of the problem but could be part of
the solution. Structural reforms in Europe could help the
rebalancing process to the extent that they boost domes-
tic demand. However, empirical evidence suggests that
their contribution to reducing global imbalances, and
particularly the US deficit, will probably be modest
(even if their positive impact on the euro area economy
Graph 4.4 Current account balances (2000–05, in billion dollars)
Source: Commission services.
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is substantial) (1). This does not mean that the role of
structural reforms in the euro area, especially of labour-
market flexibility, should be downplayed. In addition to
boosting long-term growth, more flexibility would
enhance the economy’s resilience in the face of shocks.
The unwinding of global imbalances will imply restruc-
turing of the euro area economy, accompanied by the
necessity of moving factors from one type of output to
another. Where factor mobility is low, the misallocation
and loss in output and welfare, respectively, are likely to
be significant. Reforms that reduce rigidities may there-
fore prove to be crucial, particularly in the event of a dis-
orderly rebalancing of current accounts.¥1∂ See Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, ‘Quarterly
report on the euro area’, October 2005.
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